



Fifth Report  
from the  
**Foreign Affairs Committee**

Session 2003–04

**South Africa**

Response of the Secretary of State for  
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

*Presented to Parliament  
by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
by Command of Her Majesty  
July 2004*

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**FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS**

**THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JACK STRAW MP**

I welcome the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the United Kingdom's relations with South Africa. In this Command Paper I set out the Government's response to the Committee's findings and recommendations.

The report is timely. This year South Africa celebrates the tenth anniversary of the end of Apartheid, and has just held its third parliamentary elections under universal suffrage. It is an opportune moment to assess the United Kingdom's partnership with South Africa, and to look forward to how that partnership might be improved.

Since 1994, South Africa has made a valuable contribution to conflict resolution and promotion of the peace and security agenda in Africa. It has participated fully in the international institutions that it joined or re-joined, and has promoted in them the Africa we want to see: peaceful, democratic, prosperous.

I shall be making my second visit to South Africa later in the year. I am looking forward to continuing our dialogue and taking South Africa's views on a wide range of issues. This is particularly important as we approach the United Kingdom's Presidencies of the G8 and the European Union when we propose to put Africa high on both agendas.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jack Straw". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "J" and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

JACK STRAW  
Secretary of State  
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs



## FIFTH REPORT FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

### SESSION 2003-4

#### “SOUTH AFRICA”

### RESPONSE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

The Government welcomes this latest report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, which deals with the United Kingdom's relations with South Africa. The Government has taken note of the conclusions and recommendations, and sets out its response below.

#### **Economy**

- 1. We conclude that, while there remains a number of difficult challenges to be faced, the prospects for the South African economy are generally very positive. If it is to deliver the employment and increased national prosperity the country needs, however, a significant increase in direct foreign investment will be needed. We recommend that Her Majesty's Government continue to strive to stimulate and encourage private investment in South Africa.**

We will remain engaged with the development of capacity across South Africa that will help to address the main deterrents for foreign direct investment. We will also continue briefings for business and investors, designed to give an accurate and objective view of policy and socio-economic constraints.

DFID is also supporting (both directly and through the European Union development programme) a number of initiatives designed to improve employment opportunities for poor people, including through improving the climate for investment.

In addition, UK Trade & Investment will continue to alert UK business to the opportunities for foreign direct investment in South Africa. It will provide timely and targeted advice to companies to help them make sound private investment decisions.

#### **Inequality**

- 2. We commend the South African Government for its work in tackling so boldly the lack of economic opportunities experienced by many black people in the country. We recommend that the British Government continue to work with its South African counterpart to promote a better understanding of 'Black Economic Empowerment' among British investors, and potential investors, and to assist them in seizing the opportunity that it represents.**

We will continue to research, report and highlight the opportunities and risks that Black Economic Empowerment presents to business and investors, and will engage with them to ensure that they increase their understanding of how this impacts on them.

### **HIV/AIDS**

- 3. We conclude that the British Government is playing a key role in the fight against the scourge of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, and throughout the world. As always, though, more could be done and we recommend that the Government maintain an active dialogue with the South African Government on this subject in order to assess what further assistance could be given.**

We will continue to maintain a dialogue with the South African Government and, through DFID, provide support in this important area. For several years, DFID has provided support to the health sector (condom provision, adolescent reproductive health, sexually transmitted infections) and to non-government organisations for the promotion of behaviour change. In 2003, DFID committed £30 million to support HIV/AIDS initiatives in South Africa, working with the Departments of Health, Social Development, and Defence, as well as several provincial governments, and key non-government and faith-based organisations.

In addition, through DFID, we are working for better donor co-ordination.

### **Crime**

- 4. We conclude that the fight against crime, especially violent crime, is one of the most serious, and difficult, challenges facing South Africa at this time. We recommend that the British Government continue to offer significant assistance to South Africa in this field, and that co-operation projects currently in place are strengthened and improved, particularly those relating to improving the professional training of police officers.**

We agree with the Committee's conclusion. We intend to continue our support for South African law enforcement agencies, creating linkages with UK police forces – in particular the Metropolitan Police Force. This year, we are funding secondees into the Special Investigations Unit (dealing with corruption), the Financial Intelligence Centre (tackling money laundering and financial crime) and the Independent Complaints Directorate.

### **Land Reform**

- 5. We conclude that, at this time, the South African Government appears to be pursuing a sensible and considered policy of land reform, that seeks to address the historically unequal distribution of land in the country. However, we consider it is critical to South Africa's future prosperity that**

**any moves towards land expropriations similar to those seen in Zimbabwe are firmly resisted.**

We agree with the Committee's conclusion. Through the British High Commission in Pretoria, we have developed close links with Government, civil society, academic groups and other stakeholders in South Africa in order to keep close to the development of land reform policies. We believe that expropriations in the manner seen in Zimbabwe are unlikely. However, compulsory purchase of land, within the provisions of South Africa's constitution, will continue to be pursued as one element of a broader strategy by the Government of South Africa.

DFID committed £2 million in 2002 to work on land reform issues – including strengthening civil society consultations on land policy, and strengthening capacity in the Department of Land Affairs.

### **UK-South Africa Relations**

**6. We are pleased to conclude that, in general, South Africa and the United Kingdom enjoy excellent bilateral relations on a very broad front of activities and interests. We recommend that the FCO, in its Response to this Report, sets out how it considers bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and South Africa could be strengthened further in the future.**

We will continue to work with South Africa on issues of national, regional and international importance. Several members of the Cabinet, including the Foreign Secretary, are due to visit South Africa in the second half of this year to discuss issues of concern to both countries. In addition, UK Ministers and officials seek opportunities to speak to their South African counterparts in the margins of international meetings.

The South African Minister for Finance is a member of the Prime Minister's Commission for Africa which will report ahead of the UK's G8 and EU Presidencies in 2005. We are confident that the UK and South Africa will work together to implement recommendations made by the Commission.

### **Trade liberalisation**

**7. We recommend that, within the constraints imposed on it by the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union, the British Government should do more to make clear its commitment to opening up trade to the developing world and reforming the CAP at all opportunities.**

The UK will continue to work within the EU to ensure that the WTO Round delivers for developing countries. Agriculture is of course a major issue for many developing countries, including South Africa. Radical reforms of the CAP were agreed in June 2003 and April 2004. The UK has been at the forefront of those Member States pushing for further reform of the CAP and will continue to do so. We welcomed the recent offer from the EU to phase out its export subsidies provided that others are

willing to reciprocate. UK Ministers had been calling for the EU to take a more progressive stance in the WTO negotiations, particularly on agriculture. We hope that other WTO members will engage constructively to ensure that further progress is made in the Round.

### **War in Iraq**

- 8. We conclude that the reputation of the United Kingdom in South Africa has undoubtedly been seriously weakened by differences in the two countries' approach towards Iraq. We recommend that the Government seek to repair the damage done to the relationship by this disagreement, at every possible opportunity.**

While we agree that the United Kingdom and South Africa hold different views on Iraq, we believe that it is a sign of the maturity of our relationship that we can talk openly about issues on which we disagree. Most recently, Chris Mullin MP, Minister for Africa, discussed Iraq with the South African Deputy Foreign Minister during a visit to Pretoria on 18 May 2004.

Despite differing views on Iraq, we continue to work closely with South Africa on many issues including Burundi and the Middle East Peace Process.

### **Changes in development assistance priorities**

- 9. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Foreign Office sets out how the cut in DfID's assistance to middle-income countries will affect the Foreign Office's work in South Africa, and whether alternative sources of funding will be available to carry on some of the very valuable work being done there. We further recommend that the FCO set out what inter-departmental consultation took place prior to the re-allocation being announced.**

Over the past 10 years, the UK has contributed more than £200 million to support South Africa in addressing the inequalities inherited from the apartheid era, and the growing challenge of HIV/AIDS. More recently, our development co-operation programme has focused increasingly on working with South Africa on regional and global issues, including the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

Support provided by the international community is relatively small compared to South Africa's economy, and amounts to around 1% of the government budget. Donor support is important to South Africa, not as a source of financial resources, but as a means for accessing international experience and expertise. In that context, DFID's reduced programme of £25 million per year remains a substantial one. In addition to this budget, DFID supports a further programme of work on regional issues across the Southern African region, forecast at £18 million in 2004/5 and £16 million in 2005/6.

Additional FCO programme budget money was allocated to the British High Commission in Pretoria last year. We will continue to ensure that South Africa is a priority country when considering competing bids for limited funds.

Consultation took place between the FCO and DfID on the reduction in assistance to middle-income countries world-wide so that DfID might meet its Public Service Agreement target of spending 90% of its resources in low-income countries.

### **Brain drain**

**10. We recommend that the Government ensure that the United Kingdom, while respecting the rights of individuals, does not denude South Africa of its much-needed skilled professions and continue to monitor developments in this area.**

The UK Government is fully aware of the need to recruit responsibly from overseas. The Department of Health has led the way in producing international recruitment guidance based on ethical principles. It was also the first to develop a robust code of practice, and it is the only one to publish an approved list of agencies.

In October 2003, the UK and South Africa signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Reciprocal Educational Exchange of Healthcare Concepts and Personnel, the objective being to enhance skills and to explore best practice in health care delivery.

The UK's Minister for Health will be visiting South Africa later this year to continue discussions on a number of health issues. One area to be explored is the exchange of healthcare professionals on time limited placements in order to enhance the skills database in both countries.

### **Peace-making and peace-keeping**

**11. We conclude that South Africa has played a crucial and very welcome role in its conflict resolution work across the continent. It has brought new energy and focus to attempts to settle long-running disputes such as those in Burundi and the DRC. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to offer every assistance to South Africa to strengthen its work in this vital field, while remaining fully involved in the continent itself. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO set out how it sees further co-operation in the field of peace-keeping work and training of regional forces developing in the long-term.**

We, too, welcome South African engagement in conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region, particularly their contribution to peace-keeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. South Africa played a significant role in achieving and supporting recent peace agreements in both states. We stand ready to offer continued practical and political support - last year the UK contributed £2 million to the running costs of the South African-led African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and worked hard for the recently-mandated UN peace-

keeping operation (ONUB). We take every opportunity to encourage South Africa to continue its good work as regional peace-maker and look forward to future positive collaboration towards durable peace in the Great Lakes region.

This year the UK has increased its commitment to Africa by allocating additional funds for conflict prevention. In South Africa the allocation has risen from £1.1m in 2003/04 to £2m in 2004/05. Our main effort is focussed on building peace support operations capacity and capabilities through the work of the British Peace Support Training Team. Further co-operation in the field of peacekeeping work and training of regional forces will take into account the African Union's development of an African peace and security architecture, which the UK supports.

### **Southern African Development Community (SADC)**

**12. We conclude that SADC has the potential to play a very valuable role in helping to solve many of the challenges facing its region. If it is to realise this potential, however, and to be taken seriously as a respected international organisation, it must be willing to recognise the failings of member states whose behaviour does not meet the expectations placed upon them by SADC's high aspirations.**

**13. We recommend that the British Government continue to work with South Africa, as a key player in the organisation, to support SADC's work generally and encourage it to take seriously its role in promoting good governance and respect for human rights.**

We agree that SADC has the potential to play a pivotal role in the region. Over the past three years it has made substantial organisational changes in order to meet the challenges. In 2003, it held its first Summit on HIV/AIDS and in May 2004 a Summit on regional food security. Both issues are critical to the region's prosperity and stability. But the organisation needs, too, to confront the political challenges caused by a failure in governance in some of its member states, notably Zimbabwe.

DFID and other donors are working to strengthen the capacity of SADC to contribute effectively on issues such as food security, HIV/AIDS, and trade. We will continue to work with the SADC Secretariat and its member states to promote international standards of governance and human rights.

### **Zimbabwe**

**14. We conclude that:**

**(a) South Africa and the United Kingdom unquestionably share the same objective for Zimbabwe—the return to a fully-functioning and economically vibrant democracy that respects the human rights of its citizens;**

We agree. The UK-South African shared objectives towards Zimbabwe were expressed in a joint Communique issued by the Foreign Secretary and Foreign

Minister Zuma on 14 May 2003. This Communique stated that the two countries “stressed their commitment to an outcome in which the people of Zimbabwe enjoy independence, freedom, peace, stability, democracy and prosperity.”

**(b) South Africa is acting in the manner it sincerely believes to be the most effective and the most likely to bring about the desired goal identified above;**

The Government respects the South African position that the Zimbabwean crisis could cast a real threat to the stability of the region if mishandled. The Government also notes that President Mbeki has been active in trying to bring about reconciliation in Zimbabwe, but that this is difficult to achieve when the Government of Zimbabwe has consistently shown a lack of willingness to enter into serious dialogue with the Zimbabwean opposition or civil society.

**(c) the situation of the Zimbabwean people will continue to deteriorate unless effective pressure is brought to bear on the Government of Robert Mugabe to change its disastrous and self-seeking policies, and South Africa is the best placed external force to stimulate that change; and**

We agree. But South Africa is not alone in having regional influence. A consistent African position towards Zimbabwe is necessary. The measures applied by the EU, US and others contribute to the pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe to change its policies, but can only go so far in this direction. The real pressure has to come from within the region.

**(d) South Africa, and the region more generally, will continue to suffer from Zimbabwe’s plight until such a change takes place, not least by deterring much-needed foreign direct investment.**

We agree. The crisis is having some beneficial effects in the margins for some of Zimbabwe’s neighbours (eg skilled agriculturalists relocating to Zambia and Mozambique, and some displaced tourist revenue), but the overall effect on the region is strongly negative. The opportunity cost of foregone direct investment cannot be calculated, but appears to be significant.

**15. We recommend that the British Government:**

**(a) continue to maintain the strongest possible pressure on the Zimbabwean Government to respect the human rights of its citizens and to call free and fair elections, especially through multilateral means;**

We agree. This recommendation precisely reflects the central core of our policy towards Zimbabwe.

**(b) recognise the importance of South Africa in achieving a long-term solution to the severe crisis affecting Zimbabwe;**

**(c) seek the closest possible co-operation with South Africa on achieving the mutually desired outcome of a peaceful and democratic Zimbabwe; and**

We maintain a continuous dialogue with the Government of South Africa about Zimbabwe, as well as about other issues of regional and global importance.

**(d) seek to promote a greater understanding of its genuine concerns about Zimbabwe in South Africa, and elsewhere on the continent, and the facts about the land reform issue.**

Our diplomatic representatives in Africa, particularly in southern Africa, are active in presenting the basis of the Government's concerns about Zimbabwe. We also take every opportunity to express the facts behind the land reform issue, notably by having our High Commissioners and Ambassadors set out our policies to the local media. The situation remains widely misunderstood despite the efforts of Zimbabwean exiles to emphasise that the problem is one of governance and not land.

### **The African Union**

**16. We conclude that the African Union holds the potential to deliver significant improvements in the standard of life for Africans, and should be fully supported by the United Kingdom and the EU. The recent creation of an African court of human rights and the agreement on a continental peace-keeping force are to be particularly welcomed, demonstrating, as they do, a commitment to tackle some of the most fundamental problems facing Africa at this time. South Africa has played a crucial role in all these developments.**

**17. We recommend that the Government continue to work with South Africa, and all its African partners, to assist the AU in realising the impressive ambitions it has set for itself.**

We agree with the conclusion and recommendation. Supporting institution building within the AU and helping it achieve its goals, in particular in the fields of peace and security and governance, is a high priority for the UK Government in Africa.

We would also stress that the EU has a key role to play in providing the support the AU needs and in co-ordinating Member States' efforts. This is primarily achieved through the EU/Africa dialogue, a process which has begun to work far more efficiently in recent months since both parties agreed to focus their work on a few priority areas (peace and security, governance, regional integration and trade, key development issues) and to meet in a lighter troika format. Ensuring that this dialogue is effective will be one of the UK's objectives in the run up to, and during, our EU Presidency in 2005.

### **Commonwealth**

**18. We conclude that South Africa plays a crucial role as a leading member of the Commonwealth, actively supporting the organisation's aim of bridging the gap between the developed and developing worlds and supporting global**

**respect for human rights. The recent disagreements over Zimbabwe at Commonwealth meetings—the issue that “poisons everything it touches”—should not be allowed to damage the organisation’s very valuable work, nor the UK’s working relationship with South Africa within the body. We recommend that the British Government seek every possible opportunity to restore any damage done to inter-Commonwealth relations by the recent disagreements at the Abuja CHOGM, while maintaining the organisation’s tough stance on Robert Mugabe’s continuing human rights abuses.**

We agree with the report’s conclusion. South Africa does play an active and positive role within the Commonwealth. We do not believe however that the divisions over Zimbabwe at CHOGM last December have caused irrevocable damage to the Commonwealth as an institution.

### **UN Commission on Human Rights**

**19. We conclude that the role South Africa has played at the UNCHR to prevent even the discussion of resolutions that address the appalling human rights situation in Zimbabwe is deeply regrettable, especially in light of the very positive involvement it has with the rest of the UN’s work, and could be damaging to South Africa’s wider interests.**

Despite the UK’s efforts, and those of our EU Partners, it is regrettable that the EU’s resolution on Zimbabwe was not discussed at the 2004 UNCHR. This was due again to the African Group putting forward a “No Action Motion”.

### **UN Reform**

**20. We conclude that the arguments for reform at the United Nations, particularly at the Security Council, are undeniable. We also conclude that were there to be an ‘African seat’ on the Council, South Africa would be amongst the strongest African candidates, filling nearly all of the criteria for such a position. We recognise, though, that this will be a matter for African nations themselves to settle when the time arises.**

We broadly agree with the conclusions of the Committee. There should be an enhanced African presence on the Security Council and South Africa is one of a group of obvious candidate countries that could take up a permanent seat. Our preferred model of Security Council expansion is five new permanent members (one from each of Africa, Asia and Latin America plus Germany and Japan) and four new non permanent seats (one from each of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America.).

When considering which candidates to support for permanent membership of the Security Council, we will take into account a country’s contribution to the maintenance of peace and security and other purposes of the United Nations, as required by the UN Charter. We will also consider a country’s global reach and

political and economic strength, both internationally and within a candidate's own region.

An African permanent member would be able to build up a level of expertise on the Security Council and make an effective African contribution to the Council's work. Although the African nations will strongly influence which countries from their region are on the Security Council, the final decision rests with the entire UN membership. In 2000, the General Assembly did not select the candidate, Sudan, endorsed by the African group for a non-permanent seat. Currently there is no Charter provision for rotating permanent seats.

### **Response of the G8 to NEPAD**

- 21. Given the evidence that we have seen during this inquiry, we conclude that NEPAD has the potential to deliver significant, and important, changes within Africa and to its relationship with the rest of the world. Both sides of the Partnership, though, need to understand fully both the challenges and the opportunities that it presents. African nations have to recognise that good governance and respect for human rights are central to their development prospects, and to how they are perceived by both foreign governments and potential private investors. The G8, in turn, needs to see beyond the confines of the peer review mechanism and recognise the progress that African nations have already made in delivering on their commitments.**
  
- 22. We recommend that in partnership South Africa and the United Kingdom work together to ensure that it is not simply left to 'wither and die' as so many previous programmes have been. The British Government needs to impress upon South Africa, and its fellow AU members, the importance of a rigorous peer review mechanism for spreading good governance in the continent, and for attracting much-needed foreign investment. At the same time, it should use every opportunity, especially its forthcoming Presidencies of the G8 and the EU, to ensure that the developed world delivers on its commitment to support genuine African growth and development. Mutuality is the basis of the relationship.**

We agree that NEPAD has the potential to be a significant driver for change in Africa. We believe that partnership, based on mutual accountability, should be the basis of our relationship with Africa. This means that we must take responsibility for contributing to the creation of an environment in which Africa's development can take place, while African governments take responsibility for ensuring good political and economic governance and internal stability.

We believe that both sides have already made significant progress in this partnership. Regional initiatives such as the setting up of the African Union's Peace and Security Council and the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism can be effective means to create a secure and stable environment in which Africa can develop. We agree that the peer review mechanism should be rigorous. We also consider that it

should be broad-based and participatory, involving a wide range of stakeholders including civil society. We are monitoring the first peer review, currently taking place in Ghana, which we hope will set a strong precedent for future reviews.

In tandem with these African initiatives, G8 commitments in the G8 Africa Action Plan are helping to create the external conditions for growth. During our G8 and EU presidencies we will continue to focus on key areas such as peace and security, trade, education and HIV/AIDS. The Commission for Africa, set up at the Prime Minister's own initiative, uses this new partnership as the basis for its work.

### **The War Against Terrorism**

**23. We conclude that South Africa has an important role in the war against terrorism, especially by helping to prevent international terrorists using the continent as a base for their activities elsewhere in the world. South Africa has a particularly crucial role to play, as an influential African nation in disseminating best practice in anti-terrorism activity across the continent. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to offer substantial assistance to ensure that South Africa can both combat international terrorism within its own borders and act as a catalyst for improving Africa's ability to respond to the threat.**

The Government of South Africa intends to pass anti-terrorism legislation later this year. Once passed, we will consider with the appropriate authorities what further support we are able to offer to combat terrorism and its financing.

### **Work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in South Africa**

**24. We recommend that, in the light of the importance of the United Kingdom's relationship with South Africa and the crucial work being done by the Post there, the level of staffing and resources allocated to the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa be at the very least maintained, if not increased, in the long-term.**

We are grateful to the Committee for recognising the value of the work being done by the UK Government's employees in South Africa. Whilst it is our aim to maintain staffing levels more or less as they are at present, nothing is certain. The FCO's resources are under great pressure all round. Our ability to sustain (or increase) the staffing levels in South Africa depends on the outcome of the Spending Review and on the funding of the FCO as a whole.

### **Visa entry clearance**

**25. We recommend that UK Visas continue to monitor closely the demands on staff and resources at the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa resulting from the increasing numbers of entry clearance applications being received there. We further recommend that, in its response to this**

**Report, the FCO set out what extra resources and personnel have been allocated to visa entry clearance work in South Africa since 2003.**

UKvisas monitors demands on staff and resources globally on a monthly basis. Since 1 January 2003, UKvisas has increased the South Africa employed staff in Pretoria by three to enable them to handle increasing numbers of entry clearance applications. Additional office furniture was also supplied. UKvisas has also agreed the upgrade of a further three South Africa based staff. UKvisas is currently in correspondence with our High Commission in Pretoria about a further bid for additional staff.

**Trade and investment (UKTI)**

**26. We conclude that the trade and investment section of the High Commission in South Africa is performing to a high standard in assisting British businesses to operate there and exploit new opportunities.**

We are grateful to the Committee for recognising the valuable work being carried out by staff promoting trade and investment opportunities in South Africa. We will work to maintain the current level of customer satisfaction, adjusting and improving service levels where we can.

**British Council**

**27. We conclude that the British Council is carrying out very important work in South Africa, both in promoting a deeper relationship between the two nations and in providing crucial educational support to the South African Government. We are also convinced that the Chevening scholarship scheme is a vital part of the British Council's work, and a very important way in which the United Kingdom can influence future decision-makers. We recommend that the FCO give serious consideration to increasing the number of scholarships available to South Africans in the near future.**

**28. We further recommend that the British Council continue actively to support civic organisations and to train their leadership.**

We are grateful to the Committee for affirming the importance of the British Council's work in South Africa. Our strategy towards 2010 very much focuses on promoting a deeper relationship between the two nations, and reaching larger numbers of people in South Africa. Our educational support for the South African Government is on track to continue and strengthen. We share the Committee's view that an expansion of the Chevening programme would bring excellent results in South Africa, but this depends on the overall level of resources available for the Chevening programme.

Our governance programme continues to be robust in offering support to civil society organisations in South and Southern Africa. 2004 is the year in which we

embark on an ambitious pan-African leadership programme and we expect South Africa to play a strong role within this three-year programme.

### **BBC World Service**

**29. We conclude that the BBC World Service's Bureau in Johannesburg is carrying out excellent work in producing high-quality and informative programmes for both radio and television. We recommend that the Bureau continue to be given the funding it needs to carry on this important work. We further recommend that the BBC World Service give serious consideration to increasing the resources it allocates to its Swahili service in the future**

We are encouraged by the Committee's comments on the BBC World Service's Bureau in Johannesburg. We understand that the World Service plans to maintain the level of funding it currently contributes to the Johannesburg Bureau.

Whilst the World Service has no current plans to increase direct funding significantly for the Swahili service, it has acknowledged the importance of Swahili-speaking countries in its spending bid for SR 2004 to enhance coverage of the wider Islamic world, and aims to allocate additional funding to support investment in FM distribution in those countries as opportunities arise.

### **Estate Management**

**30. We strongly recommend that the FCO does not repeat the gross error it has made in so many other locations of exchanging a valuable and appreciating property – the High Commissioner's Residence in Cape Town – which is clearly greatly assisting the promotion of United Kingdom interests, for rapidly depreciating ICT assets.**

We have noted the Committee's views on the Asset Recycling Programme and the view that the Cape Town Residence is a valuable asset in the promotion of UK interests. We have not made any decisions regarding the future of the Residence, but we are currently studying how we might make better use of, and realise some savings from, the Cape Town estate.







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
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