

NUCLEAR 2010



Background to the Review Conference
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

3–28 May 2010

The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains the most destructive threat to global security. In May 2010 the next Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) takes place. The NPT is the cornerstone of international nuclear architecture. The Review Conference presents a key opportunity for the international community to come together to reaffirm its collective commitment to the Treaty. We hope that it will agree on concrete, realistic and balanced action to strengthen its implementation to pave the way towards a safer world without nuclear weapons, with access for all to safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy which help to address climate change and to promote sustainable development.

The UK Government is committed to working with our global partners towards these vital goals. This guide provides information on the NPT, the key challenges relating to nuclear issues and our aims for the Review Conference and beyond.

Follow our coverage of nuclear issues on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website at: www.fco.gov.uk/nuclear2010

Further information relating to the NPT and nuclear issues can be found at:

Acronym www.acronym.org.uk

British American Security Information Council (BASIC) www.basicint.org

CTBTO www.ctbto.org

Global Zero www.globalzero.org

ICNND www.icnnd.org

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) www.iaea.org

International Institute for Strategic Studies www.iiss.org

Nuclear Suppliers Group www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org

Reaching Critical Will www.reachingcriticalwill.org

UN Office for Disarmament Affairs www.un.org/disarmament

Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) www.vertic.org

The opinions expressed within these organisations and websites do not necessarily reflect those of the UK Government.

In this pack:

- 1. Introduction**
- 2. Background to the NPT**
- 3. UK objectives for the Review Conference and beyond**
- 4. Preventing proliferation**
- 5. Nuclear disarmament**
- 6. Peaceful uses**
- 7. Nuclear security**
- 8. Glossary**
- 9. Annex: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970)**

For more information please visit: www.fco.gov.uk/nuclear2010

Relevant UK government departments:

Prime Minister's Office www.number10.gov.uk

Cabinet Office www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk

Foreign and Commonwealth Office www.fco.gov.uk

Department of Energy and Climate Change www.decc.gov.uk

Ministry of Defence www.mod.uk

1 INTRODUCTION

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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May 2010 will mark a decisive moment in the international community's journey towards a world without nuclear weapons.

The NPT has succeeded for the past 40 years in containing the spread of nuclear weapons. Today it remains the foundation of efforts to prevent proliferation, promote disarmament and aid the development of peaceful uses for nuclear energy. However, in recent years the NPT has been tested – particularly by the activities of Iran and North Korea.

These new threats are arising within a new nuclear context. Nuclear power is one of the energy sources that countries are increasingly likely to turn to in order to reduce carbon emissions while meeting rising energy demand. As a result, the technologies and materials for making nuclear weapons may become more widely dispersed, increasing the dangers of them falling into the wrong hands.

The Review Conference is a key opportunity to address these issues. After a decade of deadlock on these issues we must now move forward into a decade of decisions.

The nuclear threats facing the international community today cannot be overstated; unless we act decisively and act now, the situation may deteriorate irreversibly. Countering these threats requires us to realise that all states have a common interest in reinvigorating the non-proliferation regime, and that all states bear a responsibility in advancing that effort.

The UK calls on all countries around the world to seize this window of opportunity to strengthen the NPT through political will and practical measures. The choices that the world makes in May will determine whether we face a future arms race or a future of arms control; a world where we live with an increased threat of nuclear attacks or a world with enhanced security for all.


If we get it right, we will pave the way for a world without nuclear weapons, where nuclear power helps to tackle climate change and promotes development. Get it wrong, and we face the spread of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear terrorism.

The UK wants to see a renewed and reinvigorated treaty that sets out a clear way forward for a process of non-proliferation; offers a clear forward plan on disarmament; promotes peaceful and safe uses of nuclear energy; and agrees that a co-ordinated global nuclear security effort should underpin the international community's approach to the whole nuclear agenda.

Creating the conditions for success at the NPT Review Conference in 2010 is a shared responsibility which requires action by all states.

BACKGROUND TO THE NPT

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Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the international community has wrestled with the challenge of how to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy without this leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The difficulty of this balancing act lies in the fact that a state that masters the nuclear technology to generate electricity or treat cancer has also gained the knowledge needed to produce the material for a nuclear weapon.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, various attempts were made to manage this risk. States that exported nuclear materials and equipment only did so if safeguards were in place to ensure that material would not be used for military purposes. Since 1957, these safeguards have been administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

By the mid-1960s the Soviet Union, the UK, France, China and the USA had all tested nuclear weapons, leading to concern that there could soon be many more states with nuclear capabilities. This ultimately led to the negotiation of the NPT. This crucial treaty recognised the five states that had already tested nuclear weapons, and invited all other states to renounce nuclear weapons by becoming 'non-nuclear-weapon state' parties to the Treaty and accepting IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear material.

In return it was recognised that non-nuclear-weapon states should be able to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that all parties to the Treaty would work towards nuclear disarmament, as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The NPT came into force in 1970. Since then there have been three broad streams of work: one concerned with reducing the nuclear weapons that already exist, one with strengthening efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and one with developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Securing the universality of the NPT remains a key objective. At the root of this goal lies tackling deep-seated regional tensions and addressing genuine security concerns. We continue to work to bring the 'non-NPT' states closer to the international non-proliferation mainstream.

The UK fully supports the principle and practice of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which contribute greatly to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to enhancing regional and international security. The UK remains ready to pursue consultations with states party to nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties where difficulties remain.

We remain committed to providing the necessary support to states in the Middle East to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and create a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It is important that, through dialogue with the countries in the region, we identify what concrete and pragmatic steps could be taken.

We understand the importance which non-nuclear-weapon states may attach to receiving assurances that they will not be attacked or threatened with attack by nuclear weapons. We believe that the best way to grant such assurances is through nuclear-weapon-free zones as envisaged by Article VII of the NPT. The UK has already given treaty-backed Negative Security Assurances to almost 100 countries by signing up to protocols to treaties creating nuclear-weapon-free zones. We have agreed to a programme of work at the Conference on Disarmament which includes a mandate to discuss further Negative Security Assurances.

UK OBJECTIVES FOR THE REVIEW CONFERENCE AND BEYOND

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The NPT Review Conference in May 2010 should be a beginning, not an end. It must give expression to the new global mood to move from a decade of deadlock to a decade of decisions.

Working with partners from across the international community, the UK will seek a mandate for concrete, realistic and balanced action to strengthen the NPT's three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as addressing the threats to nuclear security.

The NPT should:

- strengthen the non-proliferation regime through improved safeguards, verification and compliance;
- offer a clear and credible forward plan on nuclear disarmament;
- promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy without compromising safety, security or non-proliferation;
- produce consensus on ensuring nuclear security; and
- promote the universality of the NPT and progress on a 'Middle East weapons of mass destruction free zone'.

PREVENTING PROLIFERATION

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Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Since 1957, the IAEA has been at the forefront of international efforts to deliver the safe, secure and proliferation-free development of nuclear energy. Based in Vienna, it has three main responsibilities:

1. It acts as the world's nuclear inspectorate, verifying that safeguarded nuclear material and activities are not used for nuclear weapons purposes.
2. It helps countries to upgrade their nuclear safety and security.
3. It helps countries to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, science and technology.

It is critical for international security that the IAEA maintains and strengthens its role.

As part of this process, the UK believes that the IAEA must be better able to verify whether states are engaging in illicit nuclear activity. The IAEA's additional protocol, which significantly improves the Agency's ability to detect clandestine nuclear programmes, should be made universal.

Further to this, the IAEA safeguards regime, which provides the essential foundation of international non-proliferation work, should be continuously reviewed to ensure that it is fit for purpose.

We are committed to ensuring that the IAEA has the necessary authority and capacity to verify members' obligations properly, including inspecting for indicators that states may be acquiring nuclear weapons capability and pressing for more transparency in civil nuclear activities.

However, enhancing the IAEA's ability to detect safeguard violations is not enough. Potential violators must know that if they are caught, they will pay a high price. Compliance mechanisms and procedures must be strengthened. We should consider suspending international nuclear cooperation and IAEA technical cooperation projects until compliance has been restored and the IAEA has sufficient confidence that a state's nuclear activities are purely peaceful. We should also consider developing a menu of possible actions, including sanctions, to be decided by the UN Security Council in response to violations.

Countries seeking to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remain responsible for any violations of their non-proliferation obligations before they withdraw, and should be required to return any materials or technology acquired through NPT membership. A withdrawal from the NPT may have serious implications for international peace and security and should be referred to the UN Security Council.

These steps represent the minimum standard required for the IAEA to police the nuclear non-proliferation regime effectively in the 21st century.

Country-specific issues

Ensuring that Iran and North Korea comply with their obligations is critical to maintaining the non-proliferation regime. The actions of these countries – both parties to the NPT – must not be allowed to prevent the international community from moving forward to a more peaceful era.

Should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon it would have serious proliferation consequences across the Middle East. That is why the UK is playing a key role as part of the E3+3 group of nations (the UK, France and Germany plus the US, Russia and China) to reach a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We are committed to a dual-track policy to achieve this: dialogue to encourage Iran to engage; and sanctions to restrict its ability to procure proliferation-sensitive technology. The international community has already imposed five successive UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran, three of which impose sanctions.

We have always said that Iran has the right to civil nuclear power. The E3+3 offer of June 2008 makes clear that providing Iran meets its obligations we stand ready to support its development of peaceful nuclear energy. However, we lack confidence in Iran's intentions – Iran needs to prove that its programme is purely for peaceful purposes following 20 years of deception.

Iran and North Korea face a clear choice: resolve international concerns about their nuclear programmes, or face even deeper isolation and tougher sanctions.

The world must stand together to demonstrate that action will be taken to ensure that these two states meet their obligations.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

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The Review Conference in May 2010 needs to agree a clear and credible forward plan on nuclear disarmament. Demonstrable progress on disarmament is vital to achieving international consensus on non-proliferation, and nuclear-weapon states must continue to take credible steps that command the confidence of all.

The UK is firmly committed to working with all states to create a world free of nuclear weapons. The UN Security Council summit on 24 September 2009, which adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1887, sent a united and unequivocal message of this commitment and put in place a set of measures that will command confidence and contribute to a safer world for all.

US and Russian nuclear weapons comprise some 95% of the world's total stockpile. Agreement on a new legally binding treaty to further reduce US and Russian strategic offensive arms will be a major contribution to this shared endeavour, building trust and paving the way for further reductions.

Progress by the USA and Russia needs to be complemented by efforts by other states with nuclear weapons to reduce and keep their own forces to an absolute minimum. Since the end of the Cold War the UK has led the way, by reducing the capability and increasing the transparency of our nuclear defence.

We have cut the explosive power of our total stockpile by 75%; reduced the number of operationally available warheads to fewer than 160; and reduced the number of nuclear weapons delivery systems to just one, the submarine-based Trident system. Our warheads are not targeted at any particular country, and they are at several days' notice to fire.

We now possess only around 1% of the global nuclear warhead stockpile. We have made clear that, as soon as it becomes useful for the UK arsenal to be included in a broader negotiation, we stand ready to participate and to act.

Ongoing UK activity includes the groundbreaking work being carried out with Norway (a non-nuclear-weapon state), and the non-governmental organisation Vertic, on the complex science of verifying warhead reduction. This is providing means of addressing issues that will be essential to creating a world without nuclear weapons.

Further to this, we will continue to work for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which will put progressively tighter constraints on the development of nuclear weapons. This international legal framework is an essential basis for progress towards creating a world without nuclear weapons.

A global ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices is also vital to international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. We continue to call for the immediate start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

PEACEFUL USES

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Civil nuclear power is becoming ever more important in solving the global challenges of climate change, energy security and economic development. Based on existing policies, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that global energy demand will increase by more than 40% between 2006 and 2030.

Around 30 nations currently generate power through civil nuclear programmes. It is expected that over the next 10 years a further 20 countries will pursue civil nuclear programmes to meet their energy needs.

The UK is committed to working with countries around the world to help them develop their nuclear energy ambitions in a culture of openness, transparency and confidence. With this aim in mind we believe that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference should agree on an action plan to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without compromising safety, security or non-proliferation.

As a significant national contribution to these goals, we have pledged £20 million towards establishing a National Nuclear Centre of Excellence, which will help promote the development of safe and cost-effective civil nuclear power worldwide.

A number of countries, including the UK, have also developed proposals in response to the IAEA's request for Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (MNAs). MNAs are intended to assure states which are developing civil nuclear power programmes that they will have reliable access to nuclear fuel without having to develop their own costly and complex enrichment facilities.

The UK would like to see a full menu of complementary MNA proposals, including the UK-led Nuclear Fuel Assurance. The Nuclear Fuel Assurance is a model for an agreement between the governments of supplier and recipient states, co-signed by the IAEA, to back up existing or imminent contracts for nuclear fuel supplies for peaceful nuclear energy programmes.

A Nuclear Fuel Assurance will enable supplier states to provide an additional political assurance to recipient states of a commitment not to interfere in the delivery of commercial nuclear fuel contracts, subject to recipients meeting their international non-proliferation commitments and the conditions set out in the agreement.

NUCLEAR SECURITY

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Stopping terrorists from acquiring nuclear material was not a central preoccupation when the NPT was negotiated in 1970, but today it has to be at the top of our international security priorities.

Terrorist networks have made clear their intent to acquire nuclear weapons or potentially dangerous material. It is vital that we ensure that they can never do so. This is a problem that all nations must address together, because a nuclear attack by terrorists, regardless of location, would have severe global consequences.

The Review Conference should agree that a co-ordinated global nuclear security effort must underpin the international community's approach to the whole nuclear agenda.

We welcome President Obama's Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, which will help to promote a common understanding of the threat of nuclear terrorism and build international support for effective means of countering that threat.

The UK is committed to tackling this threat, and we have developed an extensive programme of work to help address this challenge. As well as working closely with international partners such as the G8 Global Partnership and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, we have doubled our contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund so that we can assist any country who asks for help in improving the security of its nuclear facilities.

We strongly support the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and, as we complete the ratification of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, we urge all nations yet to ratify these to do so at the earliest opportunity.

GLOSSARY



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Additional protocol

An agreement in which a state grants the IAEA expanded rights of access in order to provide assurance about possible undeclared activities.

Ballistic missile defence (BMD)

Missile systems designed to intercept an enemy's ballistic missiles before they reach their target.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

An international treaty prohibiting all nuclear test explosions. The UK was one of the first countries to sign and ratify, but 11 states still need to ratify it for it to enter into force.

E3+3

The group of countries working to address Iran's nuclear programme, made up of China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the USA.

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

It is widely hoped that negotiations on such a treaty (to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices) will begin in early 2010.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organisation charged both with the control of nuclear technology to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

NPT Review Conference

A Review Conference is held every five years to review progress on implementing the NPT. The next Review Conference will take place in New York City from 3–28 May 2010.

Nuclear fuel cycle

The series of steps involved in supplying fuel for nuclear power reactors.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1970

Five states (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) which had already tested nuclear weapons joined the NPT as 'nuclear-weapon states'. All other states agreed not to develop nuclear weapons in return for guaranteed rights to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agreement by all to work towards nuclear disarmament. Only India, Pakistan and Israel have not joined the NPT.

P5 – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council

China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA.

Safeguards

The NPT requires all non-nuclear-weapon states to have agreements with the IAEA to place their nuclear material under comprehensive safeguards to check that they are not diverted for nuclear weapons purposes.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

Agreed in 1991 between the USA and Russia, START required the reduction of each side's strategic warhead deployments from about 10,000 to fewer than 6,000, and limited each to no more than 1,600 strategic delivery systems.

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)

Agreed in 2002 between the USA and Russia, SORT (also known as the Moscow Treaty) requires both sides to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012.

Uranium enrichment

A process by which natural uranium is enriched for use as fuel for power and research reactors, or into material (high enriched uranium or HEU) for nuclear weapons.

ANNEX: TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1970)

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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970)

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 'Parties to the Treaty',

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each Non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear

activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on that date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

