Sudan |
|
|
Last reviewed: 6 November 2007 |
This section is divided into the crisis in Darfur, and the situation in Southern Sudan.
Despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) by the Government of Sudan and one faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) on 5 May 2006, conflict in Darfurcontinues. It is largely a local struggle for resources, land, water and grazing rights and the related attempts to win power within the indigenous tribal administration structure. It is also an attempt to wrest more government finance to the peripheral western part of this huge country: it is no coincidence that the conflict worsened while another peripheral region – the south – was negotiating a peace agreement with the central government (see section on Southern Sudan below).
In late 2002/early 2003 the conflict reached new heights with the overt involvement of government forces and the establishment of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). The SLM waged an increasingly effective guerrilla war against the central government, police and security forces. In response, the government equipped and mobilised groups of Arab militias (known as ‘Janjaweed’) as counter insurgency forces to fightthe rebels. The excesses of the Janjaweed included rape, burning of thousands of villages and forcing the sedentary population to flee to refugee camps.
As the 2005 report by an International Commission of Inquiry (ICI) set out, the Government of Sudan, the Arab militias and the rebels are all guilty of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, which may amount to crimes against humanity and/or war crimes. Estimates suggest that the targeting of civilians has led to the displacement of more than two million people. The remoteness of Darfur means there are no reliable figures about how many people have been killed and estimates vary widely.
The African Union (AU)-brokered Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed on 5 May 2006 between the Government of Sudan and the Minni Minawi faction of the SLM. The DPA gives the rebels a say in government at the national and regional levels, and provides for a substantial reconstruction package. It also requires the Government of Sudan to show good faith in the Agreement, particularly by disarming the Janjaweed Arab militias.
But implementation has been slow, held back by the refusal of other rebel factions to sign it. The UK welcomes the renewed political process under the AU/UN. We are urging all parties to engage fully with the process. Failure to do so would fail the millions of civilians who are suffering the consequences of the conflict in Darfur.
The UK Government is gravely concerned about the situation in Darfur. Stopping the violence and providing civilian protection are the UK’s first priority: attacks on civilians, including rape, burning of villages and destruction of livelihoods must stop immediately.
The UK is at the forefront of international efforts to bring lasting peace and security to Darfur. We played a leading role in helping the UN reach international consensus on the way forward. The agreement which Kofi Annan struck in November 2006 in Addis Ababa, called for: an immediate and effective ceasefire; a renewed and inclusive political process; and increased UN support to the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS) ahead of a joint AU-UN peacekeeping mission with UN command and control structures.
The UK government has continued to lobby international partners at the AU, the UN, including Russia, China and the wider Security Council, and the European Union in a concerted effort to press the Government of Sudan to implement the conclusions of the Addis Ababa meeting.
On 31 July 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1769, which mandates the AU/UN Hybrid force for Darfur. This is an important step towards ending the conflict. The UN/AU Hybrid force will be vital to restoring peace and stability in Darfur. The UK is pressing for early and rapid deployment, which would see up to 20,000 AU and UN peacekeeping forces and up to 6,000 police and civilians to support the implementation of the DPA – and any subsequent peace agreement - in Darfur.
The UN already provides significant assistance to AMIS in the form of military personnel, police and civilians, plus logistics and aircraft. This is being implemented through a staged approach, which will result in the deployment of the joint AU-UN operation with command and control structures provided by the UN.
In the meantime the UK Government continues to support AMIS. The UK was the first cash donor and has committed £73 million since its inception. This includes £35 million pledged in 2006/07. This funds logistical support to the AU, including delivery of over 900 vehicles, support for the airlift of Nigerian peacekeepers, and payment for fuel, salaries and food. The UK has also provided military planning expertise to the AU and seconded a British observer to the mission. There is also support for AMIS’ efforts to inform Darfuris of the content and benefits of the DPA.
In the long-term, only a political process can resolve the crisis in Darfur. All parties to the conflict need to engage in serious and comprehensive negotiations. The UK welcomes the AU’s and UN’s lead in taking forward the political process, which the UK continues to support with international partners. Following a meeting of Darfur rebels in Arusha on 3-6August, negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements began in Sirte (Libya) on 27 October. The UK Special Representative for Sudan attended the meetings as an observer.
In support of the peace process, the UN and international partners – including the UK - launched the Darfur Community Peace and Stability fund in October 2007 to promote peace and reconciliation at community level where security conditions on the ground will allow this. This is intended as a peace incentive. Key principles are that interventions should ‘do no harm’ and support peace building and reconciliation. We are working closely with Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) to ensure humanitarian efforts are not compromised and that early recovery does not encourage the premature return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).
The Prime Minister re-iterated that Darfur remains a high priority for the UK during his visit to the USA on 30-31 July. To take forward the joint initiative launched with French President Sarkozy on 20 July, he promised further development aid dependent on progress on security, ceasefire, political process and humanitarian access. He warned all sides that action is required to avoid further sanctions.
There can, and will be, no impunity for the terrible crimes committed in Darfur. For this reason, in March 2005, the UK sponsored UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1593 and referred Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC). On 2 May 2007 the ICC issued arrest warrants for the two individuals named in connection with alleged atrocities in Darfur. The UK government has told the authorities in Khartoum that they must surrender the individuals and co-operate unconditionally with the ICC. The ICC will continue to have full UK support for its activities.
The destabilising effects of the Darfur conflict in the wider region, in particular Chad, need to be resolved. On 25 September, the UK co-sponsored UNSCR 1778, which authorises the deployment of an EU force and approves a UN multidimensional mission to Chad and the Central African Republic. The UN operation is intended to build the capacity of the Chadian police, to protect the refugees and IDPs and help create a more secure environment in eastern Chad. The UK takes every opportunity to call on the Governments of Chad and Sudan to stop supporting each other’s rebels and fulfil their obligations under the Tripoli agreement of 8 February 2006.
The UK is committing considerable resources to help to alleviate the immediate humanitarian crisis and will continue to push for full humanitarian access for NGOs operating in Darfur. The UK is the second largest bilateral humanitarian donor, having contributed over £290 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan (£145m to Darfur) since April 2004 and having committed £6.5m in humanitarian assistance to Chad in 2007/08.
In November, the UK assumed the observer seat reserved for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on the High Level Committee which monitors the implementation of the Humanitarian Communiqué. The Communique was signed by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the UN on 28 March 2007 and endeavours to remove bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian access in Darfur. We continue to press the GoS to comply with its commitments.
The British government remains committed to a peaceful and prosperous Sudan, and will continue to play a leading role in international efforts to support work towards a peaceful future for Darfur.
The UN Security Council (UNSC) passed several key Resolutions (UNSCR), reflecting the UN’s deep concern and its continued commitment to addressing the situation in Darfur, and in the wider Sudan:
Resolution 1590 (24 March 2005) mandated the deployment of up to 10,000 military personnel, plus a civilian component, for a UN Peace Support Operation (UNMIS) to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the civil war between North and South Sudan in January 2005;
Resolution 1591 (29 March 2005) imposed an arms embargo on all parties in Darfur and a travel ban and assets freeze against individuals (to be designated by a Security Council committee) who continue to violate the commitments they have made to end the conflict; and
Resolution 1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC). This allows the ICC to examine and act on alleged perpetrators of heinous crimes in Darfur, including those identified by the UN International Commission of Inquiry. The ICC began a formal investigation on 6 June. This was the first ever UN Security Council referral to the ICC and marks a historic step in the development of international justice and the fight against impunity for the perpetrators of serious human rights abuses. It is also a major step forward in terms of ending the culture of impunity in Darfur.
Resolution 1672 (25 April 2006) implemented the targeted sanctions mandated by UNSCR 1591. It imposed travel bans and assets freezes on four individuals from all sides to the conflict. Whether sanctions should be extended further – and in what form - is under consideration.
Resolution 1706 (31 August 2006) authorised a peacekeeping force for Darfur. It called for the deployment of up to 17,300 military personnel and up to 3,300 civilian police in Darfur. It authorised the peacekeeping force to use all necessary means (as defined by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations) to protect UN personnel, humanitarian workers and civilians, and urged parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement to sign it without delay.
Resolution 1769 (31 July 2007) mandates the AU/UN Hybrid force for Darfur. It calls for the deployment of up to 19,555 military personnel and 6,000 police and civilian personnel to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. It authorises the peacekeeping force to use all necessary means (as defined by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations) to protect UN personnel, humanitarian workers and civilians. It also calls for a renewed political process, full humanitarian access and developmental initiatives for Darfur.
The International Commission of Inquiry (ICI) reported in January 2005, regarding human rights abuses,. It detailed the many atrocities that had taken place in Darfur The Government of Sudan, the Arab militias and the rebels are all guilty of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, which may amount to crimes against humanity and/or war crimes. The report also found that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocidal intent in Darfur, although a ‘competent court’ will need to decide whether certain individuals have done so. The report also stresses that the crimes which have taken place in Darfur ‘may be no less serious and heinous than genocide’.
The ICI recommended that the situation in Darfur be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The UK co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1593 in March 2005 which gave effect to this recommendation. This was a historic decision: it is the first time that a country situation has been referred to the ICC and sends a loud and clear signal that the culture of impunity is over.
Since then, the ICC has been actively pursuing its investigations. On 2 May 2007 the ICC issued arrest warrants for the two individuals named in connection with alleged atrocities in Darfur. The UK supports the ICC and has made it clear to the authorities in Khartoum that they must surrender the individuals and co-operate unconditionally with the ICC.
The UK government has consistently supported action on targeted sanctions through the UN Security Council. UNSC Resolution 1672 imposed targeted sanctions on four individuals from all sides to the conflict. If the Government of Sudan and the rebels do not fulfil their commitments to the international community, they risk further tough measures.
Since the early 1990s there have been a number of unsuccessful attempts to find a peaceful resolution to the civil war in Southern Sudan.
However, in 2002 war-weariness and international pressure finally bought the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to the negotiating table. The peace talks held under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Kenya culminated in the signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005.
The CPA was a huge achievement, which ended more than 20 years of civil war in which more than 2 million people died and some four million were displaced. This agreement covered the key issues of self-determination for the South and separation between State and religion. It established a permanent ceasefire and set out plans for the disengagement of forces. The parties also agreed on the structure of government, including arrangements for power and wealth sharing as well as human rights. The agreement included protocols covering governance of three conflict areas outside the “historic south” that delineated from the period of British/Egyptian rule - Abyei, the Nuba Mountains (Southern Kordofan) and Blue Nile. The agreement also made provisions for national elections in 2009 and referendum for determining the status of the South in 2011.
The two sides established a Government of National Unity (GNU). The Presidency of the GNU, comprising of President Field Marshall Bashir, First Vice President Garang (leader of the SPLM/A) and Vice President Taha, was sworn in on 9 July 2005. The National Assembly met on 1 September 2005 and the formation of the GNU was announced on 20 September 2005. The GNU includes Ministers from the National Congress Party (NCP), the SPLM, the National Democratic Association (NDA) primarily the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP),Umma Party Reform and Renewal (UP R&R), the Umma Party Collective Leadership (UP CL), Democratic Unionist Party (Registered - DUP-R), United Sudanese African Parties (USAP), the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), South Sudan Democratic Forum, and Ansar al-Sunnah. The CPA provided for a devolved Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS).
Dr John Garang, the original head and lead negotiator for the SPLM/A, was killed in a helicopter accident in Southern Sudan on 30 July 2005 shortly after the CPA’s signing. Though there were rumours of sabotage, an international commission of enquiry found no wrongdoing. Garang was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, as First Vice President and President of the GoSS and President of the SPLM.
The GNU functioned until October 2007 when Kiir announced the suspension of GoSS from the GNU, citing several CPA provisions that had not been implemented on schedule. Both sides remain in dialogue to resolve the political impasse and have re-affirmed their commitment to the full implementation of the CPA. In spite of the political difficulties, there has not been a return to armed conflict between the North and South.
Despite the CPA, peace in southern Sudan remains fragile. The timetable for implementation of the CPA is beginning to slip. Northern troops have not withdrawn from all parts of the South as envisaged in the CPA, and troops loyal to the Khartoum government remain around some of the economically important oil fields. Preparations for a new census, an important pre-requisite for successful elections, are also behind. While the CPA’s security arrangements are making progress in parts of the South, the presence of other armed groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army remains a threat to maintaining peace.
Some of the CPA measures are on schedule. Following the second anniversary of the signing of the CPA, a new national currency, the Sudanese pound, was launched to replace the dinar.
A joint FCO-DFID Sudan Unit has been in operation since early 2002, reporting directly to both the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for International Development. The Sudan Unit and the British Embassy in Khartoum played a leading role supporting both the parties and the mediators at the peace talks in Kenya. The UK is pressing both sides to ensure that they abide by their commitments and implement and uphold the provisions of the CPA. This is done through the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, tasked with monitoring CPA implementation, and the development partnership with the Government of Sudan, and the GoSS.
The UK record is strong: it disbursed some £110 million of humanitarian and development assistance to southern Sudan since the Oslo conference in April 2005, where the UK pledged £317 million in aid to Sudan over three years (2005-2007). To date we have spent £290 million in the whole country and stand to exceed this pledge. This includes £47 million, which is channelled through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund over three years (2005-2007) and split evenly between North and South Sudan.
In 2007/08, the UK has committed £114 million in assistance to Sudan. This includes £6.5 million for Chad.
But faster progress on CPA implementation and a significant improvement to the situation in Darfur is a requirement for continued UK support. UK policy remains centred on the search for peace throughout Sudan including in Darfur.
Eastern Sudan has suffered from years of marginalisation and neglect. As such, it is one of the least developed areas in Sudan. In response to this marginalisation a number of rebel groups, formed mainly from the Beja and Rasha’ida tribes (the most populous in the area), have in recent years carried out attacks on government targets. Although isolated and small scale, these skirmishes had the potential to erupt into a larger-scale conflict.
In order to avoid such an escalation, in August 2006, the Government of Eritrea convened negotiations between the Eastern rebels, known as the Eastern Front (EF), and the Government of Sudan. A peace deal (the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, or ESPA) was signed in the capital of Eritrea, Asmara, on 14 October 2006, guaranteeing greater development for Eastern Sudan. The UK government welcomed the stability brought to Eastern Sudan with the ESPA and urged both sides to speed up implementation to ensure lasting peace and security in the region.
The State of Emergency in Eastern Sudan has been lifted and the cease-fire holds. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is working closely with the Government of Sudan on the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of EF troops.
The UK provides funding to the National Multi Donor Trust Fund for Sudan, which supports development activities in Eastern Sudan. The UK has also committed £6.5 million in bilateral funds to support ESPA implementation.