Korea, DPR (North Korea) |
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Last reviewed: 25 June 2009 |
At the end of the Cold War, DPRK's diplomatic position was undercut when its former wartime allies, China and Russia, established diplomatic relations with the ROK. It failed to establish new links of its own and thus found itself isolated as the ROK developed thriving economic relations, especially with China. The nuclear crisis of 1993-94 led to direct talks with the US and the signing of the Agreed Framework in October 1994. This led to the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), including the ROK, Japan, US, and EU, that was to provide the DPRK with interim heavy fuel oil and proliferation-resistant light water reactors in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear programme. Following DPRK's apparent admission to the US in October 2002 that it had been pursuing a clandestine uranium-based programme to produce fissile material, KEDO suspended its activities and the organisation has since closed down.
From the late 1990s until 2002, DPRK embarked on a period of diplomatic outreach, reaffirming ties with China and Russia through high-profile summits, while establishing relations with a number of countries, including most EU member states. However, DPRK's relations with the outside world have remained erratic, marred by renewed tensions about nuclear and missile proliferation, illicit activities and a very poor record on human rights.
In December 2002, DPRK began reactivating its mothballed reactor at Yongbyon, ejected international monitors and announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the wake of these escalations, trilateral discussions among China, DPRK and the US were held in Beijing in April 2003. With the inclusion of Japan, South Korea and Russia, Six Party Talks were inaugurated under Chinese sponsorship in August 2003. Following halting progress after three rounds, on 10 February 2005 the DPRK announced that it was suspending its participation in the talks indefinitely and asserted for the first time that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defence.
North Korea eventually agreed to return to the talks in July 2005. The fourth round concluded promisingly with a Joint Statement released on 19 September, committing DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons and abandon its nuclear programmes in return for security assurances and energy assistance. A fifth round was convened in November 2005, but broke up amid rancour. The talks remained suspended for over a year, with the DPRK citing US 'financial sanctions' for its refusal to discuss implementation of the Joint Statement.
In late October 2006, following trilateral discussions with the US and China in Beijing, DPRK announced its intention to return to the Six Party Talks. DPRK's belated decision to return to the talks, however, followed on the heels of two major escalatory acts in the second half of 2006, beginning with a battery of ballistic missile tests in July and culminating in the DPRK's underground nuclear test of 9 October.
On 5 July, DPRK test-fired a total of seven ballistic missiles of various types and ranges, including the long-range Taepodong-II, believed capable of reaching parts of the United States, but which failed shortly into its maiden flight. The launches met widespread international condemnation as a destabilising development for regional security and beyond. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1695 on 15 July condemning the launches. It further demanded that DPRK halt all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and re-affirm its 1999 moratorium on flight-testing.
On 9 October DPRK announced that it had conducted an underground nuclear explosive test in the country's northeast. While the regime claimed this as a complete success, the size of the explosion was comparatively small and could have been a partial failure. The test met concerted and prompt international opposition, expressed through UN Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted unanimously on 14 October. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the resolution mandates co-operative action by states to prevent the provision of nuclear technology, large-scale weapons and luxury goods to DPRK. It further imposes an asset freeze and travel ban on persons related to DPRK's nuclear-weapon programme and permits the inspection of cargo. DPRK's Ambassador to the UN responded by deriding the resolution as "gangster-like" on the one hand, while reiterating that DPRK's intention to denuclearize the Korean peninsula through dialogue and negotiation remained unchanged.
The fifth round of Six Party Talks finished with a meeting on 8-13 February 2007 at which the Parties renewed their commitment to the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 under a new agreement (13th February Agreement). Specifically, the DPRK agreed to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facility and allow inspections by IAEA personnel. In return, the Parties agreed to provide energy assistance to the DPRK up to the equivalent of one million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO). The Agreement established five Working Groups tasked with formulating plans to implement the Joint Statement. They focus on DPRK-US relations, DPRK-Japan relations, denuclearisation, economy and energy cooperation and Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism.
The meetings took place as scheduled but the shutdown of the Yongbyon facility and shipment of oil were delayed due to problems in arranging for the transfer of DPRK funds that had been frozen in a bank in Macau. This problem was not fully resolved until mid-June, when the DPRK invited IAEA inspectors who were able to verify that the nuclear facility was shut down on 16 July, just after the first shipment of oil was delivered.
Following further shipments of oil and meetings of the Working Groups, the DPRK agreed at the Six Party Talks in Beijing on 3 October 2007 to disable all existing nuclear facilities and to provide, also by the end of the year, a complete declaration of all its nuclear programmes and facilities. The DPRK also reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how. In return, it was to get the remainder of the 1 million tonnes of energy assistance; and the prospect of further progress on normalisation of relations with the US and Japan.
Towards the end of 2007, the DPRK started to claim that not all members of the Six Party Talks were fully living up to their commitments andslowed the disablement process. When the US declared that the DPRK had failed to provide a “complete and accurate” declaration of its nuclear programmes by the end of the year, the DPRK responded by claiming that it had given the US a declaration in November. The Six-Party Talks process appeared to have stalled. Throughout 2008 the Six-Party Talks followed a ‘stop-start’ pattern, with DPRK finally submitting an acceptable declaration in June and the US responding by taking the DPRK off its list of terrorist-sponsoring states. I In December DPRK withdrew from the process again, this time in protest at US insistence upon verification of its nuclear programme. There was no further activity as the new Obama Administration reviewed its North Korea policy. Then, on 5 April 2009, the DPRK attempted to launch a satellite, using ballistic missile technology, despite calls from its neighbours, the US, EU and UN not to go ahead with this plan. The launch was condemned in a statement issued by the Presidency of the UN Security Council as a contravention of UNSCR 1718. This was followed by a tightening of the sanctions imposed under the Resolution. The DPRK responded by threatening to test launch Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles and carry out nuclear tests if the UN did not reverse its decision on sanctions and apologise for its action.
It carried out this threat on 25th May 2009, when it conducted its second underground nuclear test. The UN Security Council called an emergency meeting that day and, after three weeks of negotiations, adopted UNSCR 1874 on 12th June 2009. This condemns the nuclear test in the strongest terms, and builds on the sanctions measures put in place by UNSCR 1718 in 2006, including an embargo on all arms exports from DPRK.
Relations between South Korea and the DPRK have remained tense since 1953, with naval clashes incurring significant loss of life occurring as recently as 1999 and 2002. However, these did not prevent a general thaw in recent years, as successive governments in Seoul pursued a policy of engagement.
After his inauguration in 1998, ROK President Kim Dae-jung introduced a policy of dialogue and co-operation, aimed at reducing tension on the peninsula. This culminated in a Summit with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in June 2000. In the 15 June Joint Declaration both sides agreed five common goals: to work independently for national unification; to recognise the common elements in the two sides' proposals for federation-confederation; to co-operate to promote a balanced national economy; to promote exchanges and co-operation; and to work towards the settlement of some humanitarian issues, including family reunions. Post-summit, a plethora of dialogue channels and high-level meetings spurred co-operation in many fields, including the establishment of the Kaesong Industrial Zone and the Mount Kumgang tourist zone within DPRK. Progress in inter-Korean dialogue was complicated by heightened US-DPRK tensions after 2002. The Bush Administration's approach towards North Korea, including its designation as a member of the 'axis of evil' in January 2002, did not always sit easily alongside the engagement policies of Kim Dae-jung and his successor Roh Moo-hyun.
Following his inauguration in February 2003, President Roh indicated that his peace and prosperity policy towards North Korea would basically adhere to the 'Sunshine policy'. In a joint declaration following the US/ROK summit in May, President Roh stated that future inter-Korean exchanges and co-operation would be conducted in light of developments on the DPRK nuclear issue. The North Koreans responded by calling into question South Korea's commitment to the 15th June 2000 Declaration. After the DPRK’s nuclear test in October 2006, the ROK delayed its response to a DPRK request for food aid. In November 2006, DPRK warned the ROK of "grave consequences" in retaliation for South Korea's unprecedented vote in favour of a North Korean human rights resolution in the UN General Assembly, claiming that it had destroyed the foundation of the 15 June Joint Declaration. But a range of inter-Korean meetings continued to take place and, as the DPRK started to implement the actions that it committed itself to at the Six Party Talks, ROK shipments of oil and food to the DPRK resumed. At an Inter-Korean Summit in October 2007 - the first since 2000 and only the second ever - the two sides agreed on the need to move towards a peace treaty to end the Korean War, and on expanded economic co-operation. During his election campaign, current ROK President Lee Myung-bak pledged to push a project to raise the DPRK's GDP to $ 3,000 per capita within 10 years, transforming it into an export oriented economy through the investment of $40 billion in an international co-operation fund. But he also made it clear that economic assistance would be conditional on DPRK progress on denuclearisation and human rights. The DPRK objected when the ROK voted for UN resolutions on DPRK human rights in March and November 2008, and March 2009 and has also taken exception to statements made by several senior South Koreans. In response, the DPRK has continued to strongly criticise Lee although he has dismissed this as mere rhetoric. Lee continues to stress that he is willing to engage and provide humanitarian aid unconditionally but still wants progress on denuclearisation. Relations between the two continued on a downward path with North Korea ratchetting up its rhetoric criticising the South Korean President and his government until the DPRK restricted access to the Kaesong Industrial Zone on 1st December 2008 and demanded that most of the South Koreans working there should leave.
The US and DPRK do not have diplomatic relations and remain officially at war. In more than 50 years since the end of the Korean War, tensions have flared periodically between the DPRK and the US. The nuclear crisis of 1993-94 brought tensions to a dangerous pitch, until the conclusion of the Agreed Framework. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2000 marked the high-point of US-DPRK relations, although doubts persisted about DPRK's nuclear ambitions.
In early 2002, amidst growing suspicions regarding DPRK's continuing pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and illicit activities, the Bush administration branded North Korea as part of an 'Axis of Evil'. In October, a senior North Korean official allegedly admitted to US Assistant Secretary James Kelly that DPRK possessed a clandestine uranium-enrichment programme. Despite mounting tension, the US continued to provide humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, mainly through the WFP.
The US has publicly stated on several occasions, most recently in June 2009, that it does not have a hostile policy towards North Korea and that it neither intends to attack or invade. However, citing various US "hostile policies" as the cause, the North on repeated occasions delayed its return to the Six Party Talks and excused its pursuit of nuclear and WMD deterrents in contravention of UN resolutions. However, the DPRK recognises that the US is its key dialogue partner in the Six Party Talks.
DPRK's relations with China and Russia had been improving until 2002 but have also been marred by renewed tensions on the peninsula. This improvement had been reflected in a number of high-level inward visits to the DPRK, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and official visits by Kim Jong Il to China and Russia. China was instrumental in bringing North Korea to talks on the nuclear issue by acting as host and convenor of the Six Party Talks since August 2003. Its proximity and importance as a supplier of food and fuels will ensure that China maintains a pivotal position in DPRK's external relations, even if the old ideological bonds have worn thin.
Without official ties, DPRK's relations with the former colonial power, Japan, remain estranged, marked by alternating bouts of tension and détente. The DPRK continues to demand compensation and an apology from the Japanese for the colonisation of Korea as pre-requisites to progress on normalisation. During former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in September 2002, the DPRK admitted that it had abducted several Japanese citizens in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This caused public outrage in Japan, and the surviving abductees were allowed to visit their families in Japan (where they subsequently settled), but not to take their children with them. In May 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang again and returned with the abductees' children. However, relations have since deteriorated further amidst mounting public anger in Japan over unresolved abductions issues and ongoing security concerns about DPRK's missile and nuclear programmes. Following DPRK's nuclear test on 9 October 2006, Japan enacted bilateral sanctions against DPRK in addition to those mandated under UN Security Council Resolution 1718, and has renewed these following the 25th May nuclear test. Bilateral trade, which had been significant for the DPRK, has shrunk to minimal levels.
Most EU members, and the European Commission , have now established diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Only France has not. The Swedish Prime Minister, Mr Persson, (who held the Presidency of the EU at the time), the EU High Representative Javier Solana and Commissioner Chris Patten visited the DPRK on 2-3 May 2001. The visit achieved its stated objectives of having extensive talks with Kim Jong Il, obtaining confirmation of a DPRK commitment to a second Inter-Korean Summit, and holding discussions on issues such as human rights, missiles and economic reform. During the visit, the DPRK also reaffirmed its moratorium on missile testing until 2003.
In November 2000 the EU adopted agreed lines of action towards the DPRK. These stated that the EU's relations, and those of its Member States, with the DPRK would take into account: continuation by the DPRK of the rapprochement begun with the ROK; responsible behaviour with regard to nuclear and ballistic non-proliferation; developments in the human rights situation, in particular observance of the UN Conventions on human rights; and access by the population to external aid, including satisfactory working conditions for foreign NGOs active in the DPRK. The EU was instrumental in tabling resolutions on DPRK at the UN Commission on Human Rights every year since 2003, concluding that the DPRK authorities have not taken concrete steps to address the international community's concerns about reports of serious human rights violations in DPRK. All resolutions were adopted by a clear majority. It has also sponsored a resolution on DPRK human rights at the UN General Assembly every year since the UK Presidency of the EU in 2005. In 2008, ROK agreed to co-sponsor (with Japan and others) for the first time.
EU Troika delegations have visited Pyongyang three times since December 2003, (November 2004 and March 2007) the last occasion being in March 2009. They held talks with the DPRK authorities on a number of issues, including North Korea's nuclear programmes and human rights.
Britain and the DPRK established diplomatic relations on 12 December 2000. The UK took this decision in the light of progress made in the DPRK-ROK dialogue. It was agreed to establish resident missions in each other's capital.