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Détente in Europe, 1972-1976
This volume complements and extends the story documented in the two preceding volumes of the series, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968-1972 and The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972-1975. Drawing upon previously unpublished records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other Government Departments, it focuses upon Britain's role in the early stages of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna, and British policy towards the Soviet Union and its European satellites during an era of détente in East/West relations. The documents reveal both the suspicions of senior officials in Whitehall regarding Soviet designs in Europe, and their doubts about the negotiating strategy and tactics of their American allies. With Washington still reeling from the Vietnam débâcle, British diplomats initially saw the MBFR talks as a mechanism for helping the Nixon administration to stave off Congressional demands for cuts in America's forces in Europe. They dismissed as a 'pipe dream' the notion that reductions could be compatible with undiminished security for all, but hoped through participation in the talks to forestall any unnecessary weakening of NATO.
The documents also highlight British concern over the slow progress made towards repairing Anglo-Soviet relations in the aftermath of the 1971 expulsion from London of 105 Soviet diplomats on spying charges. At a time when the United States, France and West Germany were deeply engaged with the Soviet Union, Britain was denounced by Moscow for clinging to 'reactionary' Cold War attitudes. Whilst, however, British diplomats were perturbed at Britain being the 'odd man out', they were determined not to abandon their chosen role as 'Cassandra to the Western alliance' and, much to Moscow's irritation, they continued to press for the closer economic and political integration of the European Community. An incoming Labour Government was at first inclined to take a more positive attitude towards the Soviet Union, and the visit which Harold Wilson paid to Moscow in February 1975 was intended to usher in a 'new phase' in the bilateral relationship. But the seemingly relentless expansion of Soviet armed might in central Europe, the Soviet Union's backing for Cuba's military intervention in Angola, and Moscow's evident readiness to exploit the 'crisis of capitalism' brought on by the downturn in the world economy, contributed to Western disenchantment with détente. By December 1976 Mr Crosland, the new Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, was preparing both to 'vulgarise' the language of détente and to awaken a complacent public to the nature of the Soviet threat by making the deadlocked MBFR talks the 'touchstone of détente' in Europe.
Publishers
Whitehall History Publishing (WHP) co-ordinates the historical publishing programmes of Whitehall departments, including the official history programme and the publications of the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence. They are published by Routledge in Whitehall Histories.
