Nuclear weapons derive very high explosive force from the fission, or splitting, of the atomic nuclei of certain types of radioactive materials known as ‘fissile materials’, typically either high enriched uranium or plutonium. In certain types of nuclear weapon (known as thermonuclear or hydrogen weapons), this explosive force is greatly enhanced by a secondary reaction involving the fusion of hydrogen atoms to form helium – the same source of energy which powers the sun.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international agreement that aims to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and ultimately eliminate them, while enshrining States parties’ rights to access and develop nuclear energy in a safe and secure environment. It entered into force in 1970.
The Conference succeeded in reaching agreement, for the first time in the NPT’s history, on a detailed and balanced set of actions to revitalise the Treaty, establishing benchmarks for future progress, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to promote the safe and secure use of civil nuclear energy and to pursue the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. It also agreed on the holding of a regional conference in 2012 to discuss establishing a Middle East zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
The UK is working to:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up as the world's 'Atoms for Peace' organization in 1957 within the United Nations family, and supports the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Agency is at the heart of international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear dossier and to ensure the benefits of safe and secure peaceful nuclear energy are accessible not just to the developed world.
The UK is an active member of the IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference. We are the fourth largest contributor to the IAEA regular budget and one of the largest voluntary donors to the Nuclear Security and Technical Cooperation Funds.
Through a Support Programme, we help maintain and further develop the IAEA safeguards regime. For example, we have provided training for over a thousand IAEA inspectors.
We promote adherence to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol by relevant states and we work with others to ensure that the Agency is fit for the challenges it faces.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty requires all non-nuclear weapon states to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This enables IAEA inspectors to check that nuclear material in declared facilities is not being diverted from civilian use.
The discovery in the early 1990s of a secret nuclear weapons programme in Iraq demonstrated the need to enhance the IAEA’s capability to detect undeclared nuclear material and clandestine nuclear activities. Over 100 states have now agreed Additional Protocols with the IAEA, granting the Agency broader information, covering all aspects of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle-related activities, broader access rights to nuclear locations and enabling it to use the most advanced verification technologies.
The aim of the NSG is to ensure that nuclear trade is for peaceful purposes and does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It brings together countries to promote the implementation of agreed Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports.
The Participating governments adopt the Guidelines into their domestic legislation, requiring exporters to seek licenses, and providing for administrative arrangements for considering license applications and proper means of enforcing decisions to deny an application.
Iran is continuing to enrich uranium up to 20% in defiance of a number of UN Security Council Resolutions and with no apparent civilian use for it. It is currently not cooperating fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which remains concerned about a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear programme.
Until Iran cooperates fully with the IAEA and addresses concerns about their nuclear programme, the international community cannot have confidence in their intentions. The UN Security Council, in passing the recent resolution 1929 on sanctions for Iran, has sent a strong signal that Iran's continued failure to comply with its international obligations cannot be ignored.
The UK and its partners remain ready to resume the talks on Iran’s nuclear programme and have made it clear that they will support its development of peaceful nuclear energy, providing it meets its obligations.
North Korea tested nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009. The UN Security Council responded by passing Resolutions 1718 and 1874.
UNSCR 1874 builds on the measures in 1718, condemning North Korea's nuclear test, clamping down on North Korea's proliferation activities and promoting the effective implementation of sanctions by introducing a monitoring mechanism.
The UK continues to urge North Korea to refrain from further provocative actions and to re-engage in dialogue with the international community.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 2010 agreed to the holding of a regional conference in 2012 to discuss issues relevant to a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
Building confidence amongst all the parties in the region and giving them full ownership of the conference will be essential for success. The UK will play a full and active role.
The Government is committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons and its obligations under the NPT. The NPT Review Conference in May 2010 succeeded in agreeing a balanced and forward-leaning action plan on disarmament that will take us closer to that goal.
The Foreign Secretary announced to Parliament in May 2010 that the UK will hold in its stockpile a maximum number of 225 nuclear warheads. The UK has previously announced that we hold up to 160 operationally available warheads; this has not changed. The additional warheads in the stockpile are required to allow for routine processing, maintenance and logistic management.
Our current declaratory policy remains as set out in the 2006 White Paper: the UK maintains a credible minimum deterrent. Ambiguity therefore plays a significant role in our nuclear doctrine – we do not confirm exactly how and under what circumstances we would use our deterrent.
The UK would only consider using nuclear weapons in self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies, and even then only in extreme circumstances.
The Foreign Secretary announced to Parliament in May 2010 that the UK would re-examine this policy as part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. This review will examine all the factors that make up our nuclear declaratory policy to ensure that it is relevant for the circumstances we face today and into the future.
The UK is the only one of the five recognised nuclear weapon states recognised by the NPT to move to a single warhead, a single delivery system and a single launch platform. Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has:
The UK Government remains committed to the maintenance and renewal of the UK’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent. It is also committed to a value for money review of the Trident programme within the framework of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. This is aimed at ensuring that the United Kingdom’s essential minimum deterrent is maintained as cost-effectively as possible.
The Ministry of Defence is working with Other Government Departments on this assessment. We will also re-examine our Declaratory Posture within the framework of the Strategic Defence Review.
Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, this international treaty prohibits all nuclear test explosions. The UK Government strongly supports the CTBT and will continue to work for its early entry into force. The UK was the first to ratify and has undertaken a voluntary moratorium for explosive nuclear testing.
A global ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices is vital to international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. We continue to work for the immediate start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
Pending the successful negotiation and entry into force of an FMCT, the UK reaffirms its voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and calls on others that have yet to do so to join us.
The UK fully supports the inalienable rights of all states parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the NPT. Oil prices and climate change will make nuclear energy attractive to many, just as growing populations and economies in the developing world will make it increasingly necessary.
There is already increased demand for the construction of new nuclear facilities worldwide. The UK is actively supporting countries wishing to develop civil nuclear power programmes with technical assistance, training, and sharing of expertise.
We have many agreements to facilitate effective collaboration. For example, we have recently signed Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with Jordan and UAE, and a Civil Nuclear Memorandum of Understanding with Kuwait.
Nuclear energy will only fulfil its full potential if it is developed within a culture of openness, transparency and confidence. There is a need for a new framework on nuclear fuel supplies, extending international control and supervision over the nuclear fuel cycle.
In 2005, the then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), invited specific proposals for Multinational Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. To date, three proposals have been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors: a proposal for an IAEA fuel bank, a proposal for the establishment of a fuel reserve in the Russian Federation, and a UK proposal for a Nuclear Fuel Assurance. A Nuclear Fuel Assurance can underpin contracts for enrichment services and can provide further assurance to those countries seeking to avoid the huge cost and technological challenge involved in establishing their own nuclear fuel cycle.
A terrorist attack using nuclear devices represents one of the most destructive risks to global security. Countering this threat requires a concerted effort on the part of the international community.
The Washington Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, focused international attention on the challenges of securing nuclear materials and measures needed to prevent these and sensitive information falling into the hands of terrorists.
The UK is at the forefront of efforts towards nuclear security. UK pledges at the Washington Summit included UK ratification of relevant international agreements, inviting international reviewers to the UK’s Sellafield Nuclear site and a firm commitment to strengthening the most important multilateral instruments.
We are also setting the highest domestic security standards, encouraging the adoption of comparable standards overseas, and working alongside partners to help reduce existing security vulnerabilities.
We continue to work closely with international partners, including through the G8’s Global Partnership (and the Global Threat Reduction Programme); the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; and by doubling our contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.
The Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP) is the UK’s largest programme of counter-proliferation assistance. It provides the UK’s contribution to the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.
This ten-year, $20 billion initiative was launched by the G8 at the Canadian Kananaskis Summit in 2002 and now involves more than 20 donors.