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Non-proliferation

Missiles (JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images)

No one wins from proliferation of nuclear weapons; it undermines the security of everyone and is the greatest enemy of nuclear disarmament. The wide community of the States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) reaffirmed its commitment to the non-proliferation regime at the Treaty’s Review Conference in May 2010.

The UK is actively supporting the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. We’re working to ensure nuclear material and technology can be shared for peaceful purposes. A key part of this is work to minimise the risk that countries that do not currently possess nuclear weapons misuse this technology and material to obtain the capability to create them.

Specifically, we support:

  • Stronger powers for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in particular strengthening the safeguards regime
  • More robust dealing with existing cases of nuclear proliferation. Ensuring that Iran and North Korea comply with their international obligations is critical
  • Stronger compliance mechanisms and procedures in the future. Potential violators must know that if they are caught, they will pay a high price. The international community should agree on how to respond when a country commits a serious breach of its non-proliferation obligations, including its IAEA safeguards obligations
  • The principle and practice of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones including the call for a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, the international community needs to be prepared to respond robustly when a country withdraws from the NPT. While we fully respect the sovereign right of any country to withdraw from the Treaty and have no intention to seek to amend it, the NPT is not like any other treaty and the risks associated with its abuse are uniquely dangerous. We recommend immediate discussions at the UN Security Council if a country announces its intention to withdraw. The IAEA should be required to report immediately on the nuclear activities of that country.

We also believe that the prospects for entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) are brighter than for many years. We will continue to make the powerful case for all states to sign and ratify the CTBT.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) IAEA (SAMUEL KUBANI/AFP/Getty Images)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up as the world's 'Atoms for Peace' organisation in 1957 within the United Nations family, and supports the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Agency is at the heart of international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear dossier and to ensure the benefits of safe and secure peaceful nuclear energy are accessible to everyone, not just to the developed world.

What does the IAEA do?

Three main areas of work underpin the IAEA's mission:

  • Safety and Security
  • Science and Technology
  • Safeguards and Verification
The IAEA verification mission is to apply 'safeguards' in order to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted for military purposes, and that countries do not develop clandestine nuclear activities. The 2010 NPT Review Conference recognised that “IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation”.

The IAEA has an important role to play in facilitating the expected global nuclear renaissance, to ensure this is not accompanied by increased proliferation risks and that it is safe and secure. This includes:
  • Advising all States undertaking nuclear power programmes for the first time, particularly on tackling the crucial task of developing the necessary legal and regulatory infrastructure (including the establishment of a competent authority), before they embark upon the construction of a nuclear installation
  • Guiding States to a full understanding of relevant Safety Standards, of Nuclear Security guidance documents and of other relevant agency documents, and conducting safety/security advisory and review missions
  • Leading and policing the development of internationally agreed mechanisms to ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel.
Read more about our work with the IAEA

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) aims to ensure that nuclear trade is for peaceful purposes and does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It brings together countries that seek to limit nuclear proliferation through the implementation of two sets of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports.

The first set of guidelines (Trigger List) governs the export of items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use. The second set of guidelines (Dual Use List) governs the export of nuclear-related dual use items and technologies - items that can make a major contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but that have non-nuclear uses as well.

The participating governments adopt the guidelines into their domestic legislation - requiring exporters to seek licenses, administrative arrangements for considering license applications, and proper means of enforcing decisions to deny an application.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Japanese Self-Defence Force members during a PSI exercise (Koichi Kamoshida/Getty Images)

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) includes nearly 200 participating nations. These nations work together to combat and prevent states (and non-state actors) of proliferation concern from carrying out their WMD and missile-related technology trade. We support PSI activities fully.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

IAEA flag, Getty Images

More information on how we support the IAEA and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.