• applications in respect of all NSG Trigger List items; and
• applications in respect of all items on the NSG Dual-Use List, when they are destined for unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, or when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such activities.

We will now, however, consider on a case-by-case basis licence applications for items on the NSG Dual-Use List destined for other activities. (Our March 2002 policy was to refuse all such exports to nuclear or nuclear-related end-users in India, regardless of the stated end-use of the item.)

We will also consider all applications to export other items assessed as licensable, including those assessed as licensable under the WMD end-use control, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account:

• the risk of use in, or diversion to, unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, or acts of nuclear terrorism;
• the risk of possible onward transfer of these items to other States for proliferation purposes, including the recipient State’s export control performance; and
• the potential utility of the items concerned for, and contribution that they would make to, such activities.

We will continue to consider applications for exports, which will contribute, to the physical protection or security of civil or military nuclear facilities or assets in India. Licences may be issued in exceptional cases, consistent with our obligations and commitments.

We will encourage contacts between UK nuclear scientists, academics and those working in or with the UK nuclear industry with their Indian counterparts, except where we consider that such contacts might be of assistance to the weapons-related aspects of its nuclear programme. Where such contacts involve the transfer of technology, which require export licences, we will continue to consider applications for such licences in accordance with the provisions of UK export control legislation, on a case-by-case basis.

WITH EFFECT FROM
10/08/2005