No dangling conversation: portrait of the public diplomat
‘If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear to man as it is, infinite.’
William Blake
Executive summary
Much has been said in recent years of public diplomacy; very little of the public diplomat. The author has tried to remedy that imbalance by crystallising the former and elaborating the latter, in part by applying some new thinking (and interpreting some not so new observations) about the role and conduct of political communications in asymmetrical conflict zones. Counterinsurgency represents, in the author’s view, the leading edge of public diplomacy tradecraft. It requires on the part of practitioners a particular combination of knowledge, skills, values and personal attributes, which is examined in this chapter.
Public diplomacy in a world on fire
At a dinner party not long ago I asked the guests what they knew or thought of public diplomacy. I received a variety of responses, ranging from eyes glazing over, to bewilderment, to requests to repeat the question. Most had no idea what I was on about, nor any obvious interest in finding out.
This experience, if sobering, was not entirely surprising. Yet I expect that in a year or two things could be quite different. The age of globalisation is stimulating somewhat of a public diplomacy renaissance.
It’s about time.
How relevant is public diplomacy in today’s world?
Extremely.¹ Our brief concerns public diplomacy, which I consider to be the conduct of international relations – the pursuit of interests, promotion of policies and ‘If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear to man as it is, infinite.’ William Blake projection of values – through the engineering of popular influence rather than the use of force or incentives. This has always been part of the diplomat’s repertoire. But it has never been more important.
Why this, why now?
As other chapters in this volume have underlined, all kinds of contemporary factors are forcing foreign ministries to rethink their role and refocus their activity: the increasing constraints on states as actors in the international system; the blurring of the international and the domestic; the revolution in communications; and the rise of transnational issues, many rooted in science and driven by technology (climate change, pandemic disease, alternative energy, genomics). Perhaps most important, vexing and complex of all is the indivisible link between development and security.
Of special interest to me are the particular challenges that, as a result, beset ‘traditional’ diplomacy – which, while still effective within its increasingly circumscribed ambit, is simply not delivering satisfactory results beyond it.
I consider the days of set-piece, ritualistic encounters across green-felt tables and identikit forms of diplomatic representation to be passing. Diplomacy may still begin and end with interstate relations, especially in authoritarian and underdeveloped settings, but the effective exercise of influence is related increasingly to forging partnerships, leveraging private sector support, managing networks and shaping public opinion. Few foreign policy objectives can now be achieved in the absence of initiatives designed to engage, understand, advocate, influence and cooperate. Whether a country needs to build international coalitions, cooperate to protect the ecosphere or compete to attract foreign investment, skilled workers and students, the cultivation of a broad cross-section of civic support has become essential to success. For it is people and populations that drive insecurity, create wealth and strengthen governments – or change them.
Listening to Lawrence?
Here I want to take you on a short diversion.
In the 14th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, published in 1929, T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) wrote the entry on guerrilla warfare.² He concluded: ‘Granted mobility, security . . . time, and doctrine . . . victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.’³
Almost a century later, it is has become painfully clear that Lawrence’s chilling lesson has gone unlearned, or been forgotten. Although recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has got some theorists – and military establishments – thinking hard about counterinsurgency,⁴ the record to date suggests that most contemporary commanders are still struggling to know how to use regular armies against an elusive, mainly indigenous enemy that enjoys a degree of popular support and intimate familiarity with life in distant, culturally complex and historically alien environments. Countering insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories and elsewhere is a very different proposition from, for instance – in diplomatic terms – negotiating a trade deal or – in military terms – modelling confrontations between colossal armoured formations facing off in places like the Fulda Gap.
It is at precisely this juncture that the public diplomat goes to work.
And here is the bridge. As militaries relearn the use of unconventional responses to the irregular threats and challenges typical of counterinsurgency, they are rediscovering the importance of political communication.⁵ In the emerging doctrines on asymmetrical conflict, the emphasis is increasingly on talking rather than, or at least in addition to, fighting; on dialogue rather than diktat; and on proximate engagement and understanding rather than the proclamation of imported truths.
Is all of this sounding more familiar now?
Public diplomacy as political warfare: two sides of the same coin?
Although not everyone will associate public diplomacy with the resolution of asymmetrical conflict,⁶ the apparent convergence in thinking about political counterinsurgency (COIN) and military public diplomacy is unprecedented. The intensity of interaction and the speed of events that typify counterinsurgency⁷ have created a huge opportunity for public diplomacy.
This association of public diplomacy with COIN is not as much of a stretch as it might initially appear. Conflict situations in many ways represent the leading edge of the craft, with useful insights to be gleaned for application to mainstream public diplomacy practice.
Creative, empathetic public diplomats, fully aware of the background and details of a given conflict, can use local knowledge to learn to think like, and in certain respects identify with, the insurgents. The potential for intelligence generation to inform policy, particularly in the critically important area of human intelligence, is real and substantial.
The more familiar, garden variety elements of public diplomacy – lobbying and advocacy; the strategic use of the media; building relationships with non-state actors; and managing networks of contacts – also have a crucial role. Furthermore, it is through these activities that diverse foreign publics have been connected to the idea of international society, and from there to attempts to build coalitions and forge consensus around shared interests, mutual gain and common values and norms.⁸
To wrap up this short analytical road trip, I see public diplomacy as an indispensable tool in tackling global challenges, in particular the nexus of underdevelopment and insecurity. It is equipped to shine in the adversarial, hard-power-riven, contested conditions that the latter creates. And the extreme context of counterinsurgency only highlights how integral public diplomacy is to achieving political outcomes in such a conflicted world.
But in the erstwhile international system, which is now looking less like a global village and more like a ragged patchwork quilt of gated communities and unkempt barrios, the public diplomat has her or his work cut out.
Curiously, though, the human dimension of the piece, by which I refer to the essence of the public diplomat as a person and as a professional, has attracted almost no notice.
This is an omission. How to fill that gap?
Parsing the public diplomat
I would respond by first asking: What are the essential skills and personal attributes of the public diplomat? What are the knowledge requirements? Is there an associated set of core public diplomacy values? And how might any of the above be acquired?
Some people are simply born with the personal qualities essential to effective political communication. Others develop them through education, experience, training and professional development. The best public diplomats probably demonstrate a winning combination of the two, displaying strong suits in both nature and nurture.
It is my conviction that, to be effective, the modern public diplomat must be characterised by the following broad competences:
1. Values – who the public diplomat is: what matters
The public diplomat’s core values and ideals include continuous and lifelong learning, historical knowledge and cultural understanding. Public service will serve as a primary motivator, although the desire to pursue national interests will not be far behind. Dialogue and communication will be favoured over compulsion or force, just as cooperation and teamwork will be preferred over ‘one-upmanship’ and showboating. A dedication to reason, fairness and the rule of law will be a prominent professional characteristic. Professional integrity, or the absence of a ‘say–do gap’ between words and deeds, and moral courage, by which I mean the wherewithal to stand up both for one’s country abroad and, when necessary, to one’s country at home, will be central. Humanism, a real interest in people and an abiding commitment to humanitarian thought and action provide the firm foundation upon which these values rest.
2. Personal qualities – how the public diplomat behaves: supple force
The public diplomat must be capable not just of exchanging views with interlocutors at the foreign ministry or chatting with other diplomats, but of swimming without effort in the sea of the people beyond the embassy gates. Personable and enthusiastic, the public diplomat will display a set of clearly defined attributes which flow from vitality and a positive disposition, as well as the possession of natural curiosity, an open, enquiring mind and a critical consciousness. Cultural sensitivity and personal awareness will lead naturally to the display of empathy and compassion, just as the capacity for quick study will find expression in improvisation, creativity and innovation. This kind of work will require ample and equal reserves of determination and commitment, energy and resilience, flexibility and adaptability. An affinity for risk management, collaboration and team-building will be crucial in establishing partnerships and mobilising coalitions of the similarly inclined. A high tolerance of, if not taste for, uncertainty and ambiguity will be essential.
3. Skills and abilities – what the public diplomat can do: new age polymath
The public diplomat will be master of the latest developments in information and communications technologies, and able, among many things, to assess the public and political environments. Before acting, the public diplomat will research and analyse, frame and position the players and issues, situate them within a strategy, and then make a plan to follow through with 141 representation, contact-making and the activation of existing networks. Effective dialogue will require deployment of listening and feedback skills in order to negotiate and compromise, advocate and persuade. The experienced public diplomacy specialist will initiate, promote and lead, resolving challenges to project a coherent image, burnish a reputation and attain objectives. In all cases performance will be managed, metrics defined, and results recorded and evaluated.
4. Knowledge – cultivating the mind of the public diplomat: acquiring versatile expertise
I have never met a foreign service officer who regretted studying international affairs, political science or economics, history, geography or law. But the public diplomat’s intellectual interests may be engaged in any of the arts or the social or natural sciences, from ethnology and anthropology to communications and languages to philosophy and literature. One understudied area relates to themes rooted in science and driven by technology which are driving the diplomatic agenda in the globalisation age: climate change, pandemic disease, weapons of mass destruction, biotechnology, genomics, energy and resource use. The important thing is to develop not only the core knowledge but the instincts, the analytical habits of mind and the educated imagination necessary for the management of the complex issues and fast-breaking situations in which public diplomacy must typically be exercised.
The new diplomat?
The perfectly formed public diplomat, then, should combine the skills of a professional negotiator with the attributes of a renaissance humanist and the temperament of a hardy handyman. For the public diplomat, developing a capacity for something referred to in French as ‘aisance’, a combination of personal and social comfort and ease, is crucial. And whether nurtured in university or developed in the field, nothing in public diplomacy has greater utility than having learned how to think (reflection, analysis and praxis), communicate persuasively and act effectively.
From this it might well be observed that the public diplomat will need all the skills, abilities and qualities of the traditional diplomat – tact, judgement, intellect, objectivity, political sense, discretion – plus a good many more. All true. But doing things ‘by the book’ and according to standard operating procedures will not always be among the public diplomat’s favoured tactics. Awaiting instructions, following orders and referring to operating manuals won’t necessarily produce results in the sorts of fast-paced, high-risk environments best suited, for instance, to public diplomacy’s irregular expression – guerrilla diplomacy.
After Hegel and Marx, and many, many social scientists since, the public diplomat might be thought of as a work in progress, an emerging professional synthesis resulting from the dialectic relationship between security and development and an inevitable twenty-first-century collision involving the conventions of traditional diplomacy (thesis) and the requirements of globalisation (antithesis).
Envoi
For better or worse, the requirement to manage better the impact of globalisation has placed the public diplomat very near the tilting and unstable epicentre of international relations – and, by extension, of contemporary diplomatic practice. Now is the time to ride the storm. Or reap the whirlwind.
We may be sure that a new world order is emerging. Though the outline remains indistinct, it appears likely that the outcome will be multipolar, that there will be a substantial number of new players each wanting a place at the table, and that the defining feature will be a power shift to Asia, the rapidly rising powerhouse of the integrated global economy. Add to this a daunting range of climatic, scientific and technological threats and challenges and all the ingredients are in place for a highly conflicted future.
Those in charge will need all the creative help they can get.
So . . . Portrait of a public diplomat? A high-functioning, well-educated, street-smart problem-solver, with an open mind, sharp instincts, a Blackberry and, when necessary . . . a Kevlar vest.
It’s time to get kitted up.
Notes
1. The literature on public diplomacy has become extensive in recent years. For a general introduction, visit the websites of the University of Southern California Center for the Study of Public Diplomacy (http://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.com) and Bruce Gregory’s Public Diplomacy Institute at George Washington University (http://pdi.gwu.edu/); peruse J. Melissen, ed., The new public diplomacy: soft power in international relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) and Simon Anholt, ed., Journal of Place Branding and Public Diplomacy. See also the Centre for Strategic and International Studies study, ‘Re-inventing diplomacy in the information age,’ at http://www.csis.org. Phil Taylor has archived a vast, and exceptionally good, selection of articles on public diplomacy and many other communications issues. See http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/index.cfm?outfit=pmt.
2. Lawrence’s remarks were based on his experience in leading the Arab revolt against the Turks in the Middle East during the First World War.
3. The complete entry is available at http://www.bellum.nu/literature/lawrence001.html.
4. In 2006, for instance, the US military issued a new counterinsurgency manual, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf. See also United States Department of State, ‘Counter-insurgency in the 21st century: creating a national framework’, Bureau of Political–Military Affairs, 11 Sept. 2006.
5. For thoughtful, full-length treatments of these issues, see, for example, General Sir Rupert Smith, The utility of force: the art of war in the modern world (New York: Allen Lane, 2005); Philip Bobbit, The shield of Achilles (New York: Knopf, 2002). There is a profusion of more specialised references too numerous to catalogue here and themed variously around closely related notions of fourth-generation war, foreign internal defence, asymmetrical and guerrilla warfare, human terrain systems, three block war (combat, relief, reconstruction) and 3Ds (defence, diplomacy, development). Readers are invited to pursue these
subjects independently.
6. These motifs common to public diplomacy and COIN are explored in more detail in Daryl Copeland, Guerrilla diplomacy: global relations in an insecure world (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming); Daryl Copeland and Evan Potter, ‘Public diplomacy and political warfare: two sides of the same COIN?’, paper prepared for presentation at the March 2008 meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco.
7. As the CIA and the US military learned during the implementation of the controversial Phoenix Program in Viet Nam, there is much scope for error and what Chalmers Johnson has termed ‘blowback’. See Dale Andrade, Ashes to ashes: the Phoenix Program and the Viet Nam War (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990); Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: the costs and consequences of American empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000).
8. In the second half of the 1990s the Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, brought forward what came to be known the ‘human security agenda’. Through the deft use of the public diplomacy formula and a lot of help from officials, he was able to rack up a string of foreign policy achievements – an international treaty banning landmines; an International Criminal Court; major initiatives on conflict diamonds and child soldiers – often despite the objections of much greater powers. See Daryl Copeland, ‘The Axworthy years: Canadian foreign policy in the era of diminished capability,’ in Fen Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Molot, eds, Canada among nations (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001).
DARYL COPELAND
Senior Advisor, Strategic Policy and Planning, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada
Daryl Copeland is a Canadian diplomat who has had postings in Thailand, Ethiopia, New Zealand and Malaysia. He has written and spoken widely on foreign policy, global issues, diplomacy and public management.
Currently Senior Advisor, Strategic Policy and Planning, at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, his previous positions have included Deputy Director for International Communications; Director for South-East Asia; Senior Advisor, Public Diplomacy; and Director of Strategic Communications Services. Elected five times to the Executive Committee of the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers, in 2000 he received the
Canadian Foreign Service Officer Award for his ‘tireless dedication and unyielding commitment to advancing the interests of the diplomatic profession’.
From 1996 to 1999 he was National Program Director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Toronto and Editor of Behind the Headlines, Canada’s international affairs magazine. He has recently completed a special assignment to prepare a book on diplomacy, development and security in the globalisation age (to be published as Guerrilla diplomacy by Lynne Rienner).
Disclaimer
This chapter has been prepared in a purely personal capacity and responsibility for the views expressed is the author's alone. It is not an expression of the policy of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or the Government of Canada, nor is the FCO responsible for the content.