Lucian Hudson, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and Alan Anstead, Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Executive summary

One of the emerging themes of modern diplomacy is the extent to which governments, businesses and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can increase their impact by working together collaboratively to address policy challenges. In this chapter we will look briefly at examples of how such collaboration has worked in practice in different contexts and the conclusions we can draw.

Elsewhere in this volume others have talked of the importance of engagement for the modern public diplomat: working with others to solve problems affecting us all. In this chapter we look at a particular model of engagement: collaboration between governments, businesses and NGOs.

At first, collaboration between these three sectors may seem unlikely. As Milton Friedman said, ‘the business of business is business’, and the popular image of the capitalist is of someone focused on commercial profit alone. One might caricature NGOs as wanting everyone to do good things which cost money (which people are reluctant to spend) and which may constrain other interests. Governments are the target of the ire both of businesses, for imposing rules and taxes, and of NGOs, for being insufficiently moral and engaged. In short, tension, rather than trust, might appear to be the norm governing relations between the three.

But one of the central themes brought out in this volume is that we are increasingly faced by challenges that are common to all of us. Moreover, there is growing recognition across government, business and the NGO community that working together, albeit at the expense of some trade-offs, may deliver results that benefit us all.

The case-studies described in this chapter show how such collaboration can come about and how it can be effective for all parties, turning competitive tension into constructive outcomes.

Elements of collaboration

There are three broad elements of collaboration running, to a varying degree, through the case-studies we examine. Together they serve as a generic model for effective partnership of this type. They are:

• convening – parties need to join together in order to be able to identify and understand the extent of their shared interests and potential for joint action. Convening power, the ability to bring the right people together, is a crucial attribute that must be possessed by at least one of the parties;
  
• co-creating solutions – parties need to work together to identify and design solutions to their shared problems, exploiting the diversity offered by their multiple perspectives, experiences, skills and creativity, and taking into account the particular requirements of each participant; and
  
• co-implementing solutions – parties need to take joint or separate action within an overall plan in order to deliver agreed outcomes.

Case-study 1: ‘Le Grenelle de l’Environnement’

The ‘Grenelle environment’ initiative is an instructive example from France of how years of disagreement between stakeholders over sustainable development policies were put aside in recognition of the importance for all parties of developing solutions. It underlines, in particular, the importance of governments using their convening power.

In a presidential election pledge, Nicolas Sarkozy promised to work with NGOs, local authorities, trade unions and employers’ associations in order to find solutions to key sustainable development issues. After his election as President, he established ‘Le Grenelle de l’Environnement’ (the name evoking 149 the place where, in 1968, the French government met trade union representatives to address the social unrest of the time). The initiative started in July 2007 with the aim of defining a five-year plan for France’s future environmental policy.¹

There followed a four-month period of consultation, debate, negotiation and drafting of recommendations, involving all the stakeholders mentioned in the previous paragraph, alongside a broader public consultation. The purpose was to agree targeted policy measures under eight thematic headings: climate change and energy; biodiversity and natural resources; health; sustainable production and consumption; green democracy; green business development; waste; and genetically modified organisms. The scope and progress of this activity are summarised schematically in Figure 11.1.

Figure 11.1: The 'Grenelle de l'Environnement' consultation process

The nature of this convening process, and the sheer number of people involved, was unprecedented. Considerable effort by the Ministry of Energy and Environment was needed to drive and sustain it.² President Sarkozy commented: ‘Grenelle stands for shared discussion and shared proposals . . . a revolution in the way we think and the way we take decisions; a revolution in our behaviour, in our policies, in our objectives and in our criteria.’³

Until the ‘Grenelle de l’Environnement’, the prospect of environmental NGOs sitting down – in order to discuss and agree solutions to sustainable development issues – alongside powerful business lobby groups with potentially opposing interests, such as those representing the agricultural sector, would have been difficult to conceive. Nicolas Hulot, a well-known French environmentalist, commented: ‘We are in the process of accomplishing in several days what we haven’t been able to do in several years.’⁴

In his address at the end of the four-month consultation process, President Sarkozy said:

‘this Grenelle is a success. It is a success that we owe to environmental non-governmental organisations, which proved equal to taking on this unusual role. I am convinced that if we had said to a number of them, ‘soon you will be working with such and such’ [they would not have believed it] . . . It was not a foregone conclusion!’⁵

What did the process achieve?

Broad public reaction to the detailed set of policy recommendations that constituted the Grenelle conclusions was overwhelmingly positive. Normally critical NGO and media voices were openly surprised that agreement had been reached on sensitive issues such as transport (restrictions on building of highways or airports, further development of the rail network), building (homeowners to be required by law to make homes energy efficient and given funding to do so), energy (the development of renewable energy to be prioritised over that of other energy sources) and agriculture (organic farming to increase from 2 per cent of cultivated land to 20 per cent; the use of pesticides to be reduced by 50 per cent; the growing of genetically modified organisms to cease).

The agreement was, of course, only the beginning of a longer process. A spokesman for Greenpeace France has acknowledged that while ‘there is an ambition, [while] there is a change of culture at the state level, [and] at the parliamentary level . . . there is unfortunately still too much ambiguity for us not to be extremely vigilant about what comes next’.⁶

As we write, the French government and parliament still need to agree the administrative, budgetary and legislative changes necessary to implement the policy proposals. A legislative package comprising three draft ‘Grenelle’ laws was introduced for parliamentary debate in April 2008, and some tough political debate no doubt lies ahead.

But the fact that all political parties and relevant business and environmental interest groups were party to the Grenelle process means the legislative process should – in theory – be easier than it would have been without the Grenelle convention.

What does the case-study tell us?

First, it highlights the importance of effective use of ‘convening power’. In this instance, the convening power of government, supported by intense government activity (from the President downwards) aimed at maintaining top-level engagement from all parties, was vital.

Second, the process was genuinely inclusive, bringing together all key stakeholders. This inclusivity provided reassurance to all parties, encouraging them to participate and, crucially, building trust. Inclusivity was further strengthened by innovative use of the World Wide Web and supporting media campaigns, enhancing the element of public consultation.

Third, convening all relevant stakeholders in an explicitly open forum helped bring to the fore a sense of underlying shared interest in finding solutions to sustainable development challenges.

Fourth, the consultation managed to convert this shared interest into a shared appreciation that working together could lead to concrete results, and was more likely to do so than each party pursuing its own agenda in isolation. Parties developed sufficient confidence to work round each other’s ‘red lines’, with a willingness to accept and manage their differences and the risks to their individual agendas.

Case-study 2: AIDS/HIV in India

In October 2003 more than 200 professionals met in New Delhi in order to establish a coordinated approach for combating AIDS/HIV in India.⁷ Participants comprised:

• business representatives from large corporations such as PepsiCo, Lafarge and the Tata Group, from the Confederation of Indian Industry and from the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS;
  
• civil society leaders from major global donor organisations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as local NGOs working in the cities and villages of India;
  
• Indian government health officials and military officers;
  
• representatives of international organisations, such as the World Bank, USAID, United Nations agencies and WHO; and
  
• community workers representing people living with AIDS/HIV in India. 

The participants held no common view on how to stop the spread of thedisease. However, they all understood its economic and social impact,and the risks of not taking action. They also recognised that afragmented approach would not work, and that joint action was necessary.

As part of a simulated AIDS/HIV crisis, organised by the international consultancy firm Booz Allen Hamilton, each participant was assigned to a team representing a major stakeholder: for example, government, local community, business, donor, NGO or media. The core of each team was made up of experts from the relevant stakeholder group, but most participants had to assume roles that were unfamiliar to them. The premise of the simulation was the need for collaboration between government and non-government actors, supported by a computer-designed model that kept track of events and tallied up the consequences of each move in the game.

What did the exercise achieve?

The two-day event started with much tension and debate about who was primarily responsible for the crisis – for example, the government for procrastinating, big business for not caring, or the media for publishing scare stories. As the game moved forward, participants remained focused on their own roles at the expense of cooperation with other stakeholder teams. The simulated crisis kept getting worse. New and unexpected problems were arising. Participants blamed each other.

Then a small change took place. One stakeholder team approached another group, asking for help (‘Would the federal government be willing to direct the majority of funds to regions where they are most needed?’). Another team followed suit (‘Could we use a corporation’s facilities to help others?’). And so it continued. The participants started to understand the linkages, collaboration and managerial style that would be necessary to deal effectively with the crisis. Creative ideas flowed. Cooperation ensued, and the crisis abated.

Ratan Tata, chair of the Tata Group, said: ‘The simulation exercise was so creative that it has motivated the 200 participants to make a new level of commitment to the AIDS/HIV issue. I believe there is a crucial need for an explosion of new initiatives and new partnerships in India, which will make an enormous difference in addressing this issue in the future.’⁸

Following the exercise, new initiatives were taken. Eight major companies expanded their workplace and community activities to encourage AIDS/HIV prevention and treatment programmes. A pharmaceutical company lowered the price of an AIDS/HIV drug. The organisations that participated in the simulation are still talking and working together to halt the spread of AIDS/ HIV in India.

What does the case-study tell us?

Like the Grenelle case-study, this example highlights the importance of effective ‘convening’, allied to genuinely inclusive identification of stakeholders and emphasis on underlying shared interest, in establishing the conditions for successful cross-sector collaboration.

It also shows the creative power that can be generated when stakeholders are given space and ‘permission’ to think outside their normal institutional and policy frameworks. The simulation, by separating participants from different disciplines and organisations into mixed teams, and asking all to focus on solutions from the perspective of other stakeholders in a safe discussion environment, produced a range of responses that standard negotiation between stakeholders would have been unlikely to achieve, especially in such an accelerated timescale. It unlocked knowledge and made connections in a genuine process of ‘co-creation’.

The simulation also highlighted the flexibility and rapid lesson-learning that such an environment can engender, through providing space for new ideas to emerge and be nurtured. The participants focused hard on what was working and what was not, rather than on issues of institutional boundaries and control, and were ready to adapt accordingly.

Case-study 3: Operation Climate Vote

Operation Climate Vote is a US-based example of a partnership between government and non-government partners, in which the parties (three US state governors and an NGO) had a shared purpose – to bring about national legislation to mitigate climate change – but in which ‘traditional’ roles were reversed.

Despite sustained lobbying by US environmental groups for legislation to stem climate change, by October 2007 neither the US House of Representatives nor the US Senate had tabled time to debate such legislation. The Environmental Defense Action Fund, an environmental NGO known for filing lawsuits against the federal US government on environmental issues, decided to mount a US$3 million television advertising campaign.⁹ The key difference between this campaign and previous advocacy of this type was that the advertisement was narrated by government figures. Three state governors – Arnold Schwarzenegger (California), Brian Schweitzer (Montana) and Jon Huntsman (Utah) – challenged Congress to cap America’s global warming pollution, telling viewers that ‘climate change is a test of leadership’ and that ‘it’s time for Congress to act’. The advertisement was broadcast at times when members of Congress were judged most likely to be watching television. Organisations with similar goals were invited to place the YouTube version of the advertisement on their own websites and the public were encouraged to lobby members of Congress.

The campaign strategy was based on the premise that high-profile state government figures were likely to have greater influence and impact on members of Congress than NGOs could achieve working in isolation.

There was further role reversal. Whereas a traditional model might see government funding an NGO to undertake work on its behalf, in this example the Environmental Defense Action Fund used its own resources to fund the campaign.

The partners therefore brought different, but complementary, assets to the partnership. The governors brought their status and influence; and the Environmental Defense Action Fund brought its financial resources, campaigning ability and public backing.

In December 2007 the Climate Security Act passed the Senate committee stage, clearing an important legislative hurdle. The presumption is that the campaign, demonstrating that the issue of climate change was not simply 157 an NGO concern, played a part in generating this political momentum. To become law, of course, the legislation still needs to be debated and passed by both the Senate and House of Representatives, and subsequently signed into law by the president.

What does the case-study tell us?

To our mind, this case-study reinforces the importance, for successful crosssector collaboration, of being prepared to step back and identify ‘top-level’ shared purpose as a prerequisite for joint action. It also underlines the premium on recognising, accepting and constructing joint action around partners’ relative strengths and weaknesses, together with a flexible approach to how the latter are deployed and managed. In this case, the stakeholders shared responsibility on the basis of an agreed understanding of their respective skills, resources and influence over the target audience, even if it resulted in some traditional roles being reversed.

Conclusion

Collaboration between government, business and NGOs is a growing phenomenon. The impact it can have suggests that it will be an increasingly important tool for the modern public diplomat.

We will be taking forward work to look in more detail at the dynamics of cross-sector collaboration and how it can best be initiated, managed and applied. However, we have tried in this chapter, by examining three brief case-studies, to identify some characteristics of successful collaboration in the hope of stimulating interest among foreign policy practitioners of the potential of this model for addressing global policy challenges.

We would summarise these characteristics as follows:

• the importance of effective use of ‘convening power’;
  
• the importance of accurately identifying stakeholders on the basis of shared interests and bringing them together in a genuinely inclusive process;
  
• the need to create a forum or process which can convert this shared interest into a shared appreciation that working together is more likely to generate concrete results than each party pursuing its own agenda in isolation;
  
• the need for each party to understand and be prepared to work with the core requirements of every other party (for example, the commercial imperative of business partners), working round each other’s ‘red lines’;
  
• the value of creating space for stakeholders to think outside their normal institutional and policy frameworks and address common problems from the perspective of other stakeholders; and
  
• the premium put on constructing joint policy and programmes of action around partners’ differing skills, resources, and relative strengths and weaknesses, together with a flexible approach to how the latter are deployed and managed.

Notes

1. See http://www.legrenelle-environnement.fr/grenelle-environnement/spip.php?rubrique112.

2. The full title of the ministry is the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and Planning.

3. Transcript of speech by President Sarkozy, Paris, 25 Oct. 2007; see http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Presentation-of-Grenelle.html.

4. Quotation published on La Vie Verte: see http://lavieverte.wordpress.com/category/grenelle/page/2/.

5. Transcript of speech by President Sarkozy, Paris, 25 Oct. 2007.

6. Quotation published on La Vie Verte: see http://lavieverte.wordpress.com/category/grenelle/page/2/.

7. See http://www.boozallen.com/about/article/9510078.

8. See http://www.boozallen.com/about/article/9510078.

9. See http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=17039.